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  Yuanmingyuan, more than a site, is an idea that has both historically 
and recently been associated with diverse ideologies and powerful group 
sentiments. In the 1980s, the construction of the Yuanmingyuan Ruins Park 
around the ruins of the early 18th century Qing imperial garden, the 
Yuanmingyuan, revived old associations and also created new ones related 
broadly to a project of nationalism in modern China. 
  Collective memory has been a concept casually or indirectly invoked in 
several studies of the Yuanmingyuan Park, and it is an effective means of 
describing the ﬂuctuating and multi-faceted discourse of Yuanmingyuan as a 
mental construct. Nevertheless, the application of collective memory as a 
framework needs to be critically examined and reﬁned. The complexity of 
producers as groups of people with varied motives, the multivocal 
representations they produce and the process of consumption undertaken by 
shifting collectives needs to be further elaborated both in terms of the 
collective memory of Yuanmingyuan and the theoretical model of collective 
memory itself. 
  This paper combines concrete analysis of representations of 
Yuanmingyuan, especially the Yuanmingyuan Park constructed in the 1980s;  
scrutiny of historical data that indicates a shift in ideas related to 
Yuanmingyuan; and relevant theory in order to approach an understanding of 
the collective memory of Yuanmingyuan—its evolution over time and how it 
has been related to material as well as mental constructs. This analysis of the 
chronological progression of the collective memory of Yuanmingyuan also 
accounts for the spatial heterogeneity of the idea at any given time, or the multiple and often contradictory meanings tied up in the conception of 
Yuanmingyuan as a physical space. It addresses how certain ideologies have 
been deliberately associated with topographical space and material objects in 
order to embed symbolic signiﬁcance aimed at constituting and reifying 
imagined social collectives. It also addresses the gaps between intended 
meanings, presented meanings and received meanings, and the complications 
of signiﬁcation at a national level that the Yuanmingyuan exposes. 
  The collective memory of the Yuanmingyuan is approached as an ever-
changing discourse attached to multiple meanings in order, on the one hand, 
to explore how similar ideas about speciﬁc historical events formed and 
functioned to sustain a sense of collective identity in modern China, and, more 
broadly, to elaborate upon the phenomenon of collective memory itself.BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
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v1. “Our Glorious and Shameful Past”: A History Lesson on the 
Yuanmingyuan
  In a 2008 monthly reader for Chinese secondary school students there 
is a dramatic monologue written by a Chinese high school student entitled, 
“The Yuanmingyuanʼs Wish,” in which the personiﬁed Yuanmingyuan laments:
  I am a letter written in blood, interweaving humiliation and pain, I 
am an eternal symbol of “the backwards will be beaten.” On my back I 
carry a past that a race cannot bear to look back upon, silently waiting 
among ruined walls, and, by that silence that grieves peopleʼs hearts 
more than an anguished wail, continuously bringing people grief. This 
destined eternal life is to forever stand in this position without 
collapsing, to leave future people with a thread of reverie, a piece of 
regret, a kind of sorrow.
  But, is my existence merely this? Does my history only contain 
humiliation? I was formerly the garden of ten thousand gardens; I am 
the countenance of a collapsed state, but this was done only after 
over a hundred years of meticulous sculpting; I  formerly stood at the 
summit of the art of Chinese architecture; I was the essence born 
from the collective wisdom of a kingdomʼs, a raceʼs, a nationʼs culture. 
But why, no matter how glorious I formerly was, do people only 
remember my pain? (Chen, Sha; my translation).
  In writing this dramatic monologue, the student is taking sides in a 
heated debate over whether the Yuanmingyuan, once an imperial garden in 
the northwestern suburbs of Beijing and now a ruins park in what has become 
a northwestern region of inner-city Beijing, should be left as ruins or rebuilt to 
convey its former splendor as an opulent Qing dynasty pleasance. Within the 
piece, the student, assuming the authoritative voice of the Yuanmingyuan 
itself, argues that “the Yuanmingyuanʼs wish” is for the latter-- to be rebuilt as a 
means to cast off the humiliations of the past. The Yuanmingyuan restoration 
debate, which has been a major focus of many Chinese scholarsʼ, expertsʼ, 
politiciansʼ and the mediaʼs attention on the Yuanmingyuan in the last several 
1decades, is rooted in historical assumptions that are, in the context of this 
piece and many other representations dealing with the Yuanmingyuan from 
the late 1980s onwards, presumed to be shared by the consuming audience. 
Who is this projected audience and what background knowledge are they 
presumed to have about the Yuanmingyuanʼs history? In this section I will 
attempt to address these questions by examining a historical narrative that is 
part of the body of “ofﬁcial histories” about Yuanmingyuan produced between 
the late 1980s and the present (2010). 
  I use the term “ofﬁcial histories” as opposed to the often-invoked 
singular term “ofﬁcial history” because I do not wish to imply that there is a 
singular ideologically consistent history of the Yuanmingyuan promoted by an 
organic entity, the Chinese state. Rather, by ofﬁcial histories, I refer to 
narratives that were approved by state authorities, share certain thematic 
unities and employ similar tropes and rhetoric. Ofﬁcial histories about the 
same subject may differ in speciﬁc references and ideas, and each narrative 
generally reﬂects its own contemporaneous political context, which is why 
even ofﬁcial histories of the Yuanmingyuan written between the late 1980s and 
the present may contain signiﬁcant ideological differences. Often these 
differences come in the form of expansions upon former narrativesʼ ideas so 
that certain thematic consistencies are maintained. In order to give an 
example of what an ofﬁcial history of the Yuanmingyuan from the 1990s is like 
and provide the background knowledge for understanding the above dramatic 
dialogue, I will examine the “Introduction to Yuanmingyuan 
History” (“Yuanmingyuanshi”) found on the ofﬁcial Yuanmingyuan Park website 
that was published online in September of 2000 but written in October of 1994 
and is also published word-for-word in a brochure sold at the Yuanmingyuan 
2Park bookstore just outside the Yuanmingyuan Parkʼs main entrance across 
from Qinghua University in Beijing. This is one of the historical texts approved 
by the Yuanmingyuan Management Bureau, the government organization that 
has overseen the maintenance of the park area since 1976. Through a close 
reading of the 1994 narrative, I will attempt to illuminate both the broader 
historical themes presented in ofﬁcial Yuanmingyuan histories during this 
period, and the presentist discourses to which speciﬁc details of the narrative 
are tied. All passages presented are my own translations of the original 
Chinese text (See Appendix 1 for a complete transcript of the Chinese text).
  In the excerpt from “The Yuanmingyuanʼs Wish” cited above, the 
personiﬁed ruined Yuanmingyuan of the present laments about her shameful 
past when she was ruined. She then suggests that there was a time, further 
back in her history, when she was glorious. Like the 2008 dramatic dialogue, 
the 1994 historical narrative divides the Yuanmingyuanʼs history into three 
distinct periods of time. Yuanmingyuan past is divided by the fault line of 1860 
into a glorious heyday and a ruined afterlife, and the present-day ruins park is 
celebrated as a reincarnation. The text of this historical account is divided into 
three sections that clearly demarcate these three historical periods: 
Yuanmingyuanʼs period of prosperity (shengqi Yuanmingyuan ੝ظჵ໌䭉), its 
period of looting and destruction (lijie ji canhui ጶ߷ٴ࢒߮), and its period of 
protection and renovation (yizhi baohu ji zhengxiu ၌ᅿอ޹ٴ੔म). The 
narrative of each periodʼs history is addressed explicitly to “the Chinese 
people” as its assumed audience, and interlaced with judgements that direct 
readers on how to interpret each period. 
  The ﬁrst section, Yuanmingyuanʼs age of prosperity, details the 
construction of the Yuanmingyuan garden: its inception under the Kangxi 
3Emperor (1661-1722) in 1707 and expansion during the reigns of his 
successors, Emperors Yongzheng (1722-1735) and Qianlong (1735-1796). It 
lists each of Yuanmingyuanʼs famous “Forty Scenes” (sishi jing ࢛ेܠ), 
beautiful natural and man-made scenery, and explains that “Yuanmingyuan” 
was the name given to the combined landmass of three separate gardens, the 
Yuanmingyuan ჵ໌䭉, the Changchunyuan Ӊय़䭉 and the Qichunyuan ៪य़
ჵ. The narrative describes various aspects of the landscape and architecture 
of this massive “garden of ten thousand gardens” ສჵ೭ჵ, including the great 
Fuhai Lake ෱ւ and the Western Palaces ੢༸࿖. The Western Palaces were 
a group of buildings built by European missionaries at the command of 
Emperor Qianlong in a Western architectural style and ﬁnished in 1759, 
however, the narrative notes, they nonetheless, “incorporated many traditional 
methods of our country.” 
  In individual paragraphs, the most important sites within the Western 
Palaces, the Xieqiqu ཾحझ, Haiyantang ւԅಊ and Dashuifa େਫ๏ 
fountains are each described. An interesting tidbit about the Haiyantang is also 
included: the twelve statues of the animals from the Chinese zodiac that stood 
to each side of the fountain and spouted water every two hours replaced 
Western-style nude statues to produce “a masterpiece of Chinese-Western 
fusion.” The section also touches upon the cultural relics (wenwu จ෺) housed 
within the Yuanmingyuan—paintings, books, carvings and other ﬁne objects 
made by the Qingʼs most skilled artists and now, unfortunately, almost all lost. 
“This, from one perspective, reﬂects the great destruction imperialist invadersʼ 
burning of the Yuanmingyuan has inﬂicted upon human culture,” an unnamed 
narrator interjects.
4  The main thrust of this section, as summed up in its conclusion, is to 
highlight Yuanmingyuanʼs grand scale, aesthetic achievement and artistic 
wealth in order to posit Yuanmingyuanʼs greatness as representative of 
Chinese cultural greatness: 
In general, Yuanmingyuan is truly a very remarkable, outstanding 
garden. You could say it collected thousands of years of 
accomplishments of our nationʼs extraordinary art of garden 
construction, bringing our nationʼs classical gardens to new 
heights...In fact, Westernersʼ esteem for Chinese gardens originated 
with the Yuanmingyuan. In short, Yuanmingyuan has won honor for 
our civilized ancient nation; formerly it was the pride of our Chinese 
race. 
The sites and objects speciﬁcally emphasized in this section—the Forty 
Scenes, Fuhai Lake, the Western Palaces and cultural relics—are all relevant 
to the multifaceted discourse of Yuanmingyuan today and assumed to be at 
least somewhat familiar to the projected audience of the text.
  The Forty Scenes were a combination of landscapes and architectural 
sights in the Yuanmingyuan designated as extraordinary by Emperor 
Qianlong, who had a painting made of each scene and wrote accompanying 
poems for them himself in 1744. This 80-page collection of pictures and 
poems was looted from the Yuanmingyuan in 1860 and taken to France, 
where it remains today in the French National Library in Paris. A copy of the 
collection was brought to China in 1980, and in 1983 a volume containing 
prints of the paintings followed by the poems was published in China 
(Yuanmingyuan: Lishi 2). This collection was one of the primary resources for 
scholars attempting to reconstruct the Yuanmingyuan in the late 20th century. 
Beginning in the 1980s, the paintings of the Forty Scenes were widely 
reproduced in books, banners, documentaries and brochures about the 
5Yuanmingyuan, ensuring their recognition by a large portion of the Chinese 
public. 
  Fuhai Lake is one of the features of the original Yuanmingyuan that was 
successfully dug up and reﬁlled as part of the construction of the 
Yuanmingyuan Park in the early 1980s. Its tangibility today, undistinguished 
from the original Fuhai Lake, makes its reference in Yuanmingyuan history 
particularly relevant to a present-day audience. The reconstructed Fuhai lake 
region was opened to the public in 1985, three years before the public opening 
of the Yuanmingyuan Ruins Park, and is now one of the key features, besides 
the ruins, of the contemporary park tour. 
  The Western Palaces are emphasized in the narrative for a similar 
reason. Although a small section of the original massive garden, they survived 
the burning of 1860 relatively intact because they were built primarily of stone 
in the Western architectural tradition rather than wood, of which most of the 
other Chinese-style structures in the Yuanmingyuan were made. Today the 
ruins of the Western Palaces are the best-preserved feature of the original 
Yuanmingyuan. For this reason, they have come to stand for the entire park 
and are the object of most touristsʼ visit to the park or “the telos of the 
Yuanmingyuan tour” (Lee 169). The Xieqiqu, Haiyantang and Dashuifa 
fountains within the Western Palaces are singled out in particular, because 
they are the most complete surviving structures today and most prominently 
featured in the tour. The images of the ruins of the Haiyantang and Dashuifa 
fountains are also widely reproduced on the covers of books, brochures, maps 
and other commodiﬁed objects associated with the Yuanmingyuan, making 
them the most widely recognized images associated with the park. 
6  The mention of “cultural relics” and the destruction of “human culture” 
that the loss of such relics is associated with in the 1994 narrative adds 
another layer to Yuanmingyuanʼs cultural greatness, by suggesting that the 
garden is not simply great in the context of China, but in the context of the 
world; Yuanmingyuan is proof that China is and always was a great civilization, 
to be ranked among the top internationally. The words “cultural relic” (wenwu 
จ෺) and “human culture” (renlei wenhua ਓ㜎จԽ) are counterparts to 
existing Western concepts, key terms in an international discourse about the 
value of sites, architecture, works of art and artifacts from a particular nation 
as part of that nationʼs heritage as well as a greater universal human heritage. 
Magnus Fiskesjö explains how the concept of cultural heritage was used to 
bolster Chinese nationalism in his article, “The Politics of Cultural Heritage”: 
In the twentieth century, Western-derived notions of cultural heritage 
were taken up, to accompany a new competitive national identity. This 
included the idea of heritage as property guarded by national laws, all 
according to the dominant model of property relations as the default of 
all social relations and of the nation-state as the default owner of its 
own territory and riches, on the new competitive arena of “inter-
nationality. (229).
By invoking these terms, the narrative is asserting Chinaʼs place within this 
discourse of national cultural heritage. An increasingly controversial part of this 
discourse is a heated international struggle over repatriation issues—whether 
or not objects taken from their original locations during earlier periods of 
history should be returned, and the ramiﬁcations of carrying out such returns. 
Beginning in the late 20th century and with increasing vigor in the 21st century, 
Chinese ofﬁcials and self-proclaimed patriots have pursued the repatriation of 
what they consider Chinaʼs cultural relics, especially artifacts looted from the 
Yuanmingyuan Garden by foreigners in 1860. The twelve zodiac statues of the 
Haiyantang, mentioned anecdotally in the 1994 narrativeʼs description of the 
7Western Palaces, are perhaps the most well-known objects of Chinaʼs 
repatriation efforts today. The 1994 narrative of the Yuanmingyuan, with its 
assertion of the cultural value and signiﬁcance of the Yuanmingyuan and its 
cultural relics to not only China, but the world, invokes the discourse of cultural 
heritage and implicitly advocates for the repatriation of Yuanmingyuan objects. 
(I will discuss these ideas and how they relate to the discourse of the 
Yuanmingyuan in more detail in section 5).
  The circumstances for the loss of these objects is recounted in the next 
section of the 1994 narrative: the Yuanmingyuanʼs looting and destruction. 
These events are not so much foreshadowed in the ﬁrst section as lamented; 
they are a tragic fact that the audience is presumed to already know. The 
transition from the ﬁrst section to the second in the narrative reads as follows: 
“Then this very famous garden, in October of 1860, suffered the destruction of 
the English-French Allied Armiesʼ (yingfa lianjun ӳ๏৳फ) barbaric plunder 
and became the humiliating history of our country today.” The second section 
begins with a statement about how the pre-destruction Yuanmingyuan ought to 
be understood, who should be praised and who blamed : “The 
Yuanmingyuanʼs garden masterpieces and precious collections of art are all 
the crystallization of the blood and sweat as well as knowledge of the 
multitudes of laboring people.” (Note that this idea is also contained in the 
dramatic dialogue, where the Yuanmingyuan of the past is “the essence born 
from the collective wisdom of a kingdomʼs, a raceʼs, a nationʼs culture”). “They 
embodied the splendid culture of our countryʼs feudal age, they also exposed 
the limitless extravagance of the feudal emperor.”
  The section then goes on to brieﬂy reference the First Opium War 
(1839-1842) between China and the Western imperialist nations, the domestic 
8Taiping Rebellion (1850-1864), whose purpose was to “oppose the corrupt rule 
of the Qing Dynasty,” and the Second Opium War (1856-1860), an escalation 
of the imperialist aggression of the ﬁrst war. The Opium Wars and the 
consequent destruction of the Yuanmingyuan are described as the fault of two 
primary agents: the corrupt Qing government and the aggressive foreign 
imperialists. The formerʼs incompetence and corruption led to Chinaʼs 
backwardness and inability to stand up against the West—the cowardly 
Emperor Xianfeng even ﬂed the Yuanmingyuan days before the Western 
armies arrived, leaving it with scant defenses, the narrative notes. The latter 
exploited Chinaʼs weakness to invade Chinese territories and impose unequal 
treaties upon the feeble government. 
  The actual invasion of the Yuanmingyuan began on October 6,1860. 
According to the narrative, French and British troops attacked the 
Yuanmingyuan and, although more than twenty Chinese guards fought 
valiantly, they were overwhelmed by sheer numbers and the French and 
British armies were able to enter the gates. The next day, the looting began. 
“The second day that the English-French invading soldiers entered the 
Yuanmingyuan, they were not able to resist the temptation of loot anymore; 
both ofﬁcers and soldiers proceeded in a big group to plunder, ﬁercely 
engulﬁng the gardenʼs gold and silver valuables and artistic treasures.” A 
description is given “according to French and British soldiers, priests and 
reporters who participated or witnessed the looting.” The looting is described 
as a scene of mass chaos and wanton destruction, with the soldiers 
haphazardly grabbing and ﬁghting over loot, smashing whatever they could 
not take and taking pleasure in the ransacking. “By October 9, when the 
9French army temporarily withdrew from the Yuanmingyuan, this beautiful 
garden had already been devastated into an eyesore.” 
  Next, the infamous burning of the Yuanmingyuan is recounted. After the 
Qing government had agreed to peace negotiations but before it had formally 
signed them, “the ringleaders of the English China-invasion force, Elgin and 
Grant, in order to leave a grand and severe impression of the China-invasion 
and force the Qing government into long-term submission, made the excuse 
that their prisoners had been mistreated and brazenly gave the command to 
burn down the Yuanmingyuan.” The entire garden was set aﬁre, and most of 
the buildings and artifacts within, including palaces, temples and precious 
works of art, were destroyed. “According to related sources and records,” 
when the invaders were burning the Anyou Palace, they locked the doors, 
causing 300 people to be burned alive. “The atrocities of the invaders really 
make one want to point ﬁngers!” the unnamed narrator interjects at this point.
  In the aftermath of the burning, “the perpetrators of the arson looked 
upon this misdeed as a great achievement, but the upright people of the world 
were infuriated by this barbaric act.” Lines are cited from a letter written by the 
famous French author, Victor Hugo, strongly condemning his own countrymen 
for the Yuanmingyuanʼs looting and burning and it is noted that while the 
Yuanmingyuan was still burning, imperial representatives signed the Treaty of 
Tianjin and the Treaty of Peking, ceding land over and promising to pay 
indemnities to England, France and Russia. 
  Later, the narrative explains, the Dowager Empress Cixi (1861-1904) 
began reconstruction efforts on the Yuanmingyuan, but had to halt them after 
less than ten months because of money shortages. Even after building the 
[New] Summer Palace (Yiheyuan ၊࿨䭉), Cixi did not abandon her hopes of 
10rebuilding the Yuanmingyuan and had a few buildings reconstructed. In 1900, 
the Eight Nation Allied Armies (baguo lianjun ീࠃ৳फ) invaded Beijing, 
“burning, killing, capturing and looting.” Ci Xi ﬂed and chaos ensued. Local 
bandits took advantage of the chaos to pillage the remainder of the 
Yuanmingyuan, completely destroying the architecture and landscape. 
  Afterwards, the narrative continues, the remnants of the Yuanmingyuan 
were picked apart by bureaucrats, warlords, corrupt businessmen and 
government ofﬁcials. Those who were responsible for protecting the ruins tore 
down sections of it and used its materials in other gardens and construction 
projects. The Yuanmingyuan was reduced to ruins. The section ends by 
reiterating who was responsible for the Yuanmingyuanʼs destruction and 
urging the Chinese people to see it as a national lesson:
In a decade the Yuanmingyuan was destroyed. It was destroyed at 
the hands of the English and French invaders as well as by the 
corruption and incompetence of the Qing government. Its destruction 
is a testimony to the Western invadersʼ ruin of human culture, it is also 
proof that even in the case of a civilized and ancient nation, the 
backwards will be beaten. We, the Chinese race, do not desire to 
bully other races, but we also will not allow others to bully us. In order 
to leave the tragedy of Yuanmingyuan forever in the past, strive to 
forge ahead, descendants of the Yellow Emperor!
This passage employs the same aphorism used in the dramatic dialogue 
presented at the start of this section, “the backwards will be beaten” (luohou jiu 
yao aida མ޳बཁѫଧ). This is a phrase commonly used in discussions of late 
19th century and early 20th century Chinese history, especially in the context 
of the Opium Wars. It has been so often evoked in association with Chinese 
humiliation at the hands of imperialists that it has become virtually 
synonymous with the idea. One 1997 article from the journal 
“Methods” (Fangfa ํ๏) uses the aphorism with a question mark, “The 
Backwards Will be Beaten?” as its title and begins:
11I donʼt mean to preach this moral to our countryʼs public. Chinese all 
understand this moral--they understand it only too well; thereʼs no 
need to preach it. In the past hundred plus years, the immeasurable 
amount of fresh blood of people with lofty ideals, the countless 
unequal treaties of a shamed and powerless nation, and the 
incalculable ceding of territories and paying of indemnities, has 
already engraved these famous words “the backwards will be beaten” 
deeply into our hearts. It would not be an exaggeration to say that it is 
the single most powerful spiritual motivator for us to fully invest in the 
establishment of modernization. (Wu, my translation).
The article is, on the one hand, a reassessment of the aphorism, and on the 
other, an avowal of its having been ingrained into the vocabulary and memory 
of the Chinese populace in the context of the Opium War defeat as something 
of which they are unconsciously conscious. The 1994 narrative similarly 
assumes a certain historical consciousness of its presumed audience, “the 
Chinese race.”  
  In the narrativeʼs conﬁguration of protagonists and antagonists, the 
Chinese people, as a national group, is the victim of the Manchu government 
and the foreign imperialists, who are the source of the Yuanmingyuanʼs (and 
by synecdoche Chinaʼs) demise. The idea that the Yuanmingyuanʼs 
destruction was a “national humiliation” (guochi ࠃᡄ) shared by all Chinese 
people has a long history rooted in the popular nationalism of the ﬁrst decade 
of the 20th century, although the discourse of national humiliation itself as 
Chinaʼs humiliation at the hands of imperialists, has also been associated with 
other events such as the Twenty One Demands issued by Japan in 1915. (I 
will address the development of the national humiliation narrative more 
systematically in section 3). By portraying the looting and burning of the 
Yuanmingyuan as a story of national humiliation in which China was bullied by 
imperialists, the 1994 narrative builds upon this idea from traditional narratives 
and promotes national solidarity premised upon ideas of shared national 
12culture and history, and racial alterity, a process that I will elaborate upon in 
section 4.   
  In order to perpetuate the idea that the Yuanmingyuanʼs burning was an 
injury to the Chinese people, the narrative downplays local peopleʼs 
subsequent exploitation of the Yuanmingyuan by naming the looters “bandits,” 
and attributing subsequent exploitation of the gardens to “warlords” and 
“corrupt ofﬁcials,” differentiating these groups from the Chinese people. The 
Chinese people are the victims of all of these other groups, since it was due to 
the peopleʼs toil and great culture that the original Yuanmingyuan existed. By 
establishing these ideas, the narrative neatly doles out credit for the 
Yuanmingyuanʼs glory to the Chinese people and blame for its destruction to 
the old government regime and those groups outside of or opposed to the 
ideal of the citizen. This paves the way for the next section, in which the 
emergent Communist government who, as opposed to the corrupt imperial 
family, is “for the people,” reforges Yuanmingyuan and, by analogy, Chinese 
cultural glory, leaving behind the era of national shame.
  The third section of the narrative begins by declaring, “After the entire 
nation was liberated [in 1949], the Party and the Peopleʼs Government 
absolutely emphasized the protection of the Yuanmingyuan ruins.” The 
Yuanmingyuan became a public park and a place for the preservation of 
cultural artifacts. It underwent renovations that included environmental 
restoration efforts. “Even in the midst of ten years of upheaval, the 
Yuanmingyuan was, in the end, still preserved.” Preservation efforts became 
especially vigorous after the Yuanmingyuan Management Bureau was formally 
established in 1976. In 1979 the Yuanmingyuan history exhibit was 
established and visitors swarmed to the site. In 1983 the area was formally 
13declared the “Yuanmingyuan Ruins Park” (Yuanmingyuan Yizhi Gongyuan ჵ
໌䭉၌ᅿެ䭉) and, beginning in 1984, the Yuanmingyuan Management 
Bureau and farmers from the village of Haidian (within whose boundaries the 
park was built) cooperated to develop and construct the Ruins Park. After 
several years of reconstructive efforts, ticket booths were set up and the park 
was open to the public in 1988. The narrative establishes these new 
developments as having signiﬁcance for the Chinese race:
Yuanmingyuanʼs interest, tragedy, glory and shame are intimately 
related to the fortune of the Chinese race. Although the ruins park was 
only recently set in motion, it is nevertheless a great turn in the 100-
year history of the Yuanmingyuanʼs destruction, it is the historical 
beginning of the recovery of the famous garden and uncovers a new 
page for the history of garden development in the capital; it has 
become the symbol of the rejuvenation of Chinese civilization.
  Since then, the narrative continues, the park has continued to undergo 
renovations. Many famous sites of the original Yuanmingyuan have been 
reconstructed, some of the ruins have been reassembled and steps have been 
taken for their preservation. Landscaping and reforestation work has been 
done in many areas. “[The park] is rich with the distinctiveness of ruins, but 
also has the function of a public park; it is a place to promote patriotic 
education, as well as a place for the people to stroll and rest.”
  The narrative then reiterates that the Chinese state worked together 
with the farmers in the area to build the park. In 1990 and 1993 the land was 
formally expropriated from the farmers for the non-agricultural populace. 
According to the narrative, this was necessary in order to build the ruins park 
and protect cultural relics and historical sites. “Hereafter, along with the 
furthering of reform and opening and the development of the citizensʼ 
economy, the Yuanmingyuan ruins is set to become a distinctive and well-
14known spot for tourism, better serving the two civilizations construct in our 
countryʼs socialism.”
  “The two civilizations construct in our countryʼs socialism” refers to the 
ideas of material civilization and spiritual civilization as the two keystones of a 
modern society that China must simultaneously pursue (Deng 17, 
"Shehuizhuyi” 4149). The new Yuanmingyuan Parkʼs contributions in 
promoting both material and spiritual civilization in China was one of the 
arguments justifying its construction (Yuanmingyuan: Lishi 587). These ideas, 
associated with Chinese Communism, were widespread in Chinese political 
ideology of the early 1990s. As with the aphorism, “the backwards will be 
beaten,” the reader is presumed to be familiar enough with the terminology for 
it to require no explanation.
  This last section serves the interests of the current government regime 
in several important ways. It casts the post-1949 Chinese state as the new 
hero of the narrative who comes and restores the Yuanmingyuan, thereby 
casting off the shame of its destruction and renewing its glory. Where the old 
imperial government let the Yuanmingyuan fall because it was weak and 
corrupt, the new government not only has the strength and resources to undo 
the damage, but rebuilds the Yuanmingyuan as a public park for the people in 
contrast to a private pleasance of the Manchu Emperor. By reclaiming this old 
site of political power and reshaping it according to socialist ideology,  the 
narrative asserts the governmentʼs legitimacy as the ﬁtting ruler of the new 
Chinese nation.
  The Yuanmingyuanʼs reincarnation as a ruins park where tourists can 
come to experience history also speaks to the modernity of the Chinese nation 
in a global arena by providing China with material evidence of its ancient 
15culture, a distinction seen as being possessed by all great Western 
civilizations:
This same China which is loaded with so much history and so many 
memories is also oddly deprived of ancient monuments. In the 
Chinese landscape there is a material absence of the past that can be 
most disconcerting for cultivated Western travelers - especially if they 
approach China with the criteria and standards that are naturally 
developed in a Western environment. (Ryckmans 2).
The Yuanmingyuan Ruins Park embodies a part of modern Chinaʼs endeavor 
to make up for this lack, and be able to participate along with Western nations 
in the global arena of civilized modernity. To this end, it is presented as a 
symbol of “the rejuvenation of Chinese civilization.”
   The 1994 narrative addresses the problem of local farmersʼ eviction 
from the land that was used to build the Yuanmingyuan Park, an act that many 
of the residents of Yuanmingyuan resisted for years, by emphasizing the 
stateʼs subsequent cooperation with the farmers in the construction of the new 
Yuanmingyuan Park. This was an arrangement in which local residents, who 
had no choice but to leave their homes and livelihoods, were paid wages by 
the government to work on the construction of the new park. (See Broudehoux 
70-74 and note 77 on p.91).  
  Let us turn back for a moment to the dramatic monologue, “The 
Yuanmingyuanʼs Wish.” Embedded in the studentʼs argument is the 
assumption that the current function of the Yuanmingyuan ruins is to recall 
Chinaʼs era of shame. Utilizing the pathos invoked by the voice of the 
Yuanmingyuan itself, the student suggests that the Yuanmingyuan be read 
differently, as a symbol of the glory of Chinese civilization, and that rebuilding 
the Yuanmingyuan would be the way to convey this message. In fact, both of 
these interpretations of the Yuanmingyuan--as a symbol of national humiliation 
16and a symbol of cultural greatness-- are espoused by ofﬁcial histories of the 
Yuanmingyuan such as the 1994 narrative discussed in this section. The 
student, by opposing these two interpretations as the two options for reading 
the park, is subconsciously subscribing to these ofﬁcial conceptions of the 
Yuanmingyuan and aiding their dissemination in the collective consciousness 
of other readers. 
  Thus far in this section, I have attempted to summarize and 
contextualize one example of an ofﬁcial narrative of Yuanmingyuan history in 
order to ﬁll in the background knowledge and ideological assumptions that it 
posits its audience as already having, and illustrate how it speaks to a variety 
of discourses active at the time of its creation. While I do not claim to be an 
unbiased narrator, my motive, as far as possible, has been to explain how the 
narrative functions—that is, how it alludes to or omits speciﬁc ﬁgures, words or 
events—by examining its political context without passing judgement upon the 
narrative itself or the ideological motives invested in it. Now that I have, in 
some capacity, established how the Yuanmingyuan is presented in the ofﬁcial 
narrative written in 1994, I will locate the same narrative in the context of 
changing ideas in China about what the role of history ought to be.
  In a book entitled Mirroring the Past: The Writing and Use of History in 
Imperial China, Ng and Wang write about a traditional Chinese outlook 
towards history where:
History was essentially the record of the operation and inﬂuence of 
moral forces and principles in the lives of past personages, whose 
behavior and agency were in turn brought to bear on the well-being of 
the state and society. Thus history was normative; it was a moral 
narrative guided by the principal didactic function of celebrating 
virtues and deterring vices. History was not only considered morally 
edifying, but it was also thought to be capable of proffering trustworthy 
socioeconomic and political precedents and analogies, so that it 
served as a most reliable guide for contemporary statecraft. The 
17abiding historiographical conviction held that juxtaposing and probing 
similar events of past and present would yield invaluable practical 
insights crucial for the betterment of the state and society. (Ng and 
Wang xi).
To what extent are ofﬁcial narratives of the Yuanmingyuan, like the 1994 one I 
examined above, continuations of this tradition of “mirroring the past in the 
present?” One way to address this question is to look at conclusions drawn in 
the narrative and what they are meant to accomplish. The section on 
Yuanmingyuanʼs age of prosperity concludes with the assertions that the 
Yuanmingyuan “collected thousands of years of accomplishments of our 
nationʼs extraordinary art of garden construction” and was “the pride of our 
Chinese race.” The aim of these statements appears to be to establish the 
Yuanmingyuan as part of a cultural tradition belonging to a Chinese race, 
reifying the notion that both shared race and shared culture belong to the 
national group, Chinese. 
  The second section on Yuanmingyuanʼs looting and destruction 
concludes with the assertion that Yuanmingyuanʼs destruction is “a testimony 
to the Western invadersʼ ruin of human culture”and “proof that even in the 
case of a civilized and ancient nation, the backwards will be beaten.” This not 
only re-establishes the idea that members of the “civilized and ancient” 
Chinese nation share both a culture and a history, but opposes them to 
“Western invaders” who not only destroy Chinese culture speciﬁcally, but 
universal “human culture,” implicitly making them uncivilized. The contradiction 
inherent in the notion that China is, on the one hand “civilized” (wenming จ໌) 
and, on the other hand, “backwards” (luohou མ޳) is reconciled through the 
accreditation of the civilization encompassed in Yuanmingyuan to the toil and 
knowledge of “the multitudes of laboring people” and the accreditation of the 
18backwardness that led to its destruction to the “corruption and incompetence 
of the Qing government.”
  The third section of the narrative concludes that the new Yuanmingyuan 
Park is symbolically “the rejuvenation of Chinese civilization” and physically “a 
place to promote patriotic education, as well as a place for the people to stroll 
and rest.” The proposed symbolic function of the new Yuanmingyuan serves to 
parallel the present day with the golden age of the original Yuanmingyuanʼs 
prosperity, imposing continuity between the old China and the new China as 
peaks of the same continuous civilization. The self-proclaimed function of the 
park as a place both for patriotic education (aiguozhuyi jiaoyu ιࠃओၬڭҭ) 
and for people to stroll and rest highlights its utility for the people who make up 
the national group. The term “patriotic education,” in the context of the 
Chinese narrative, is not meant negatively as a form of nationalistic 
indoctrination or brainwashing but, is a connotatively positive term, somewhat 
akin to civic education. Nonetheless, many, particularly non-Chinese scholars, 
have reacted critically to this self-proclaimed function of the park.
  The discovery that the overarching intent of the 1994 ofﬁcial narrative of 
Yuanmingyuan history is to promote ideas and feelings of national solidarity, or 
nationalism, is perhaps, strikingly obvious; it is acknowledged within the 
narrative itself and by many scholars writing of the Yuanmingyuan. Yet, few of 
these scholars take the time to dissect such narratives and understand how 
nationalism is promoted within them, or what nationalism means in different 
contexts. A close examination of the 1994 narrative suggests that nationalism 
is a banner under which diverse and even, in some cases, contradictory 
ideologies may rally, and that, while ofﬁcial narratives such as this one may 
19distort or omit historical facts to promote nationalistic aims, this does not imply 
that they do so simplistically or univocally. 
  In their discussion of historyʼs function in imperial China, Ng and Wang 
write that “the Chinese conception of history as the repository of recoverable 
lessons for present and future actions is an instance of the inexorable 
presence of the presentist motives in the endeavor to disinter the past” (xiii). 
They thus acknowledge the presentist motives that colored investigations and 
applications of the past in imperial China, while insisting that the underlying 
ethic was to “disinter the past” or discover its truth. They defend the traditional 
Chinese approach to history as a resource for moral ediﬁcation in the present 
from contemporary criticsʼ claims that such an approach lacks academic 
objectivity by arguing that imperialist scholarsʼ approach was informed by 
“ﬁdelity to what had actually happened” (xii). Whether or not we agree with this 
optimistic assessment of imperial historiography, it is undeniable that post-
imperial historiography, particularly post-1949 Communist historiography, held 
a different ethic about what the function of history ought to be and how it ought 
to relate to the present. In the introduction to a collection of essays, Using the 
Past to Serve the Present, Jonathon Unger describes a post-1949 shift from a 
Confucian to a Marxist historiography, which emphasized economic and social 
history and class struggle, and was premised upon an idea of historical 
progress rather than a cyclical notion of time. Historians, instead of scrutinizing 
the past for its moral bearing on the present, were to be “handmaidens to the 
Party propagandists” who searched for “the exact timing of each of the stages 
of history, to ﬁt the preconceived notions handed down to them by the Party 
leadership.” (3). Geremie Barmé in his chapter “History for the Masses” within 
this collection of essays, focuses particularly on the post-Cultural Revolution 
20period of the1980s and early 1990s when motived groups, both those 
conforming to the Party Line and those seeking to subvert it, were distorting 
and ﬁctionalizing past events to serve present agendas. Both the imperial and 
Communist approaches to historiography seek to use the past to justify or 
critique the present. The general difference seems to be that imperial 
historians shufﬂed through an established and revered tradition of the past to 
ﬁnd events that could be interpreted to serve the ends of the present, whereas 
Communist historians felt justiﬁed to alter events of the past in order to ﬁt a 
predetermined interpretation that served the ends of the present. These very 
broad ideas about how history has been viewed and used in China may not 
hold true for every case, however the 1994 narrative of Yuanmingyuan history 
examined in this chapter, and similar ofﬁcial histories of the Yuanmingyuan 
produced from the 1980s to the present, do appear to reﬂect an ethic of history 
in which the goals of promoting state legitimacy and national unity overshadow 
ideals of historical ﬁdelity. 
  Of course, manipulating representations of history in order to support 
political ideologies related to state legitimacy and national solidarity is not a 
phenomenon unique to China and can be viewed in a modern context as part 
of a more global project of constituting and reifying the nation-state, in which 
many agents of various nationalities have participated. Nonetheless, 
standards of academic objectivity and ideals of history as a quest for factual 
knowledge, associated with vague ideas of modernity and progress, to which 
many 21st century scholars are committed, oppose this sort of deliberate 
historical distortion. These scholars seek to deconstruct narratives such as the 
1994 narrative of Yuanmingyuan history examined in this chapter by 
21recovering pieces of history that have been left out and conﬂict with the 
ideological messages of ofﬁcial histories. 
  In the next section, I will discuss arguments and historical ﬁndings that 
oppose or critique parts of ofﬁcial Yuanmingyuan histories promoted by 
Chinese authorities beginning in the 1980s. In particular, I will focus on a 
historical account of the Yuanmingyuan written by the Australian sinologist, 
Geremie Barmé. This will pave the way for an examination, in section 3, of the 
collective memory of the Yuanmingyuan as a discursive fantasy shaped by 
such representations as the 1994 ofﬁcial Yuanmingyuan history, which are 
promoted by motived agents and consumed by multiple individuals who then 
form a collective. By applying collective memory theory I will attempt to trace 
another kind of Yuanmingyuan history which, rather than focusing on historical 
events themselves, focuses on how these historical events were interpreted 
and presented among different groups in different periods of history and the 
various motives and ideologies that fueled Yuanmingyuan narratives.  Section 
4 focuses on the consumers of such narratives and the changing degrees to 
which representations of Yuanmingyuan affect their emotions and beliefs. By 
examining speciﬁc changes in the discourse of Yuanmingyuan, I seek a better 
understanding of how collective memories form and dissipate. Finally, section 
5 takes a look at some more recent associations the Yuanmingyuan has taken 
on in order to address the question: what about Yuanmingyuan makes it such 
a potent site for collective memory formation?
222. Barméʼs “The Garden of Perfect Brightness, A Life in Ruins”: A 
Counter-Narrative
  Geremie Barmé wrote a very different Yuanmingyuan history in 1996, a 
year after he was labeled an extremist in China for his article “To Screw 
Foreigners is Patriotic: Chinaʼs Avant-Garde Nationalists” (Gries 10) and a 
year before the British returned Hong Kong to Chinese rule, symbolizing for 
many Chinese an end to the humiliations of the Opium War era. Whether his 
intent or not, Barméʼs narrative can be seen as a foreign scholarʼs response to 
the historical distortion and overt propaganda of the ﬁrst narrative, a desire to 
“set the record straight.” However, it also manifests the desire to explore 
signiﬁcant changes in Chinese culture and society through the microcosm of 
the Yuanmingyuanʼs tumultuous history. Like ofﬁcial Chinese narratives, 
Barméʼs narrative interprets the fate of the Yuanmingyuan as reﬂective of the 
fate of China itself, although for Barmé this is the result of major events in 
Chinaʼs history and politics affecting the Yuanmingyuan, not any inherent 
symbolism tying the Yuanmingyuan to the Chinese people. In another article 
published twelve years later in 2008 entitled “Beijing, a garden of violence,” 
Barmé somewhat inverts the relationship by discussing the broader history of 
Beijing from the mid 20th century in terms of the process of gardening, inviting 
the reader to view this work as an extension of his article on the 
Yuanmingyuan.
  Many accounts of the Yuanmingyuan have been written by non-
Chinese scholars since the construction of the Yuanmingyuan Ruins Park in 
the 1980s, often in the context of greater works on various aspects of Chinese 
culture or society. James Hevia in his 2003 book, English Lessons: The 
23Pedagogy of Imperialism in Nineteenth Century China, details the looting and 
subsequent burning of the Yuanmingyuan palace in 1860 in order to illustrate 
the pedagogical project of English imperialism, in which violence, in the form 
of both warfare and law, was employed as a means of establishing English 
superiority, and justiﬁed as a necessary part of civilizing inferior races. While 
acknowledging the arrogance and brutality of the English, Hevia does not 
romanticize the Chinese as hapless victims, but analyzes the political and 
ideological motivations on both sides. In his last chapter, he addresses the 
effects imperialism and English pedagogy have had on 20th century Chinese 
ideology, in particular, the conﬂicted Chinese nationalism that emerged, built 
upon an idea of national humiliation but also ambivalently grounding itself on 
ideas of cultural glory. In the very last section of his book, he describes the 
Yuanmingyuan Park as an example of one of the most “highly charged sites of 
national humiliation” that ﬁgures into the late 20th century state project of 
“producing, preserving and restoring national history” (340). The changing 
status of Yuanmingyuan loot from 1860 is also a subject addressed in Heviaʼs 
book, and ﬁgures centrally in two articles he has written (See “Loot's” and 
“Plunder”).
  Anne-Marie Broudehoux in a 2004 book, the Making and Selling of 
Post-Mao Beijing, discusses the Yuanmingyuan in a rather different context. 
She details the entire history of the imperial garden, including its prosperity 
during the Qing, its destruction beginning in 1860 and continuing through the 
20th century, and the construction of the Yuanmingyuan Ruins Park in the 
1980s, primarily to show that the extant Yuanmingyuan Park is a site where 
history has been repackaged to serve the ideological and economic aims of 
the Chinese state. She describes the historical narrative promoted in the park 
24as a “single-stranded interpretation of history” that “while serving the 
nationalist cause and promoting unbounded love for the motherland...presents 
a clear danger by encouraging xenophobic feelings among park visitors” (81). 
To support a prominent theme in the book that the Chinese stateʼs projects of 
nation-building often end up hurting common Chinese citizens, she also 
addresses the forced eviction of farmers and other residents who occupied the 
land where the state decided to construct the Yuanmingyuan park, arguing 
that such an act “denies the equal validity of different layers of historical time, 
and implies that the imprints left by the Emperor and his entourage are more 
valuable to the nation than those of the ordinary Chinese citizens who lived at 
Yuanmingyuan” (82). 
  In another very different study of the Yuanmingyuan published in 2008 
and entitled “The Ruins of Yuanmingyuan: Or, How to Enjoy a National 
Wound,” Haiyan Lee focuses mainly on the present day park as a site that 
“gathers disparate material and discursive elements into itself and binds their 
incompatibility into a heterotopia wherein the contradictions of post-socialism 
are displayed and negotiated” (160). Among the different kinds of 
emplacement she identiﬁes in the Yuanmingyuan park are that of ruinscape, 
gardenscape and Disneyscape, representing respectively the aesthetics of 
ruins, renewal and commercialization. By analyzing concrete representations 
within the park such as museum displays and tourist grafﬁti, and the 
discourses surrounding them, both ofﬁcial and unofﬁcial, she concludes that 
the Yuanmingyuan is “a most apt spatial metaphor of contemporary China and 
a schooling ground for the art of socialist neoliberal citizenship: of being able 
to reconcile authoritarianism and freewheeling capitalism, patriotic loyalty and 
25cosmopolitan sensibility, self-righteous rage and aesthetic and sensual 
enjoyment” 185).
  Given the wealth of evocative materials on the Yuanmingyuan with 
which I could engage, I have chosen to address Barméʼs 1996 narrative in 
more depth not only because it appears in the bibliographies of all three texts I 
discussed above and has exercised unquestionable inﬂuence upon 
subsequent works about the Yuanmingyuan, but also because its focus is on 
presenting a comprehensive scholarly history of the Yuanmingyuan, therefore 
stylistically and in terms of content, it naturally contrasts with the 1994 Chinese 
ofﬁcial narrative I examined in the previous section. Structurally, Barméʼs 
narrative is also very different from the 1994 narrative; it abandons the 
tripartite life, death and reincarnation view of Yuanmingyuan history, instead 
starting at Yuanmingyuanʼs birth as an imperial pleasance, and working 
through various destructive and altering stages of its history, until the gardenʼs 
1996 state, in which the future is left open to possibility. In his introduction, 
Barmé presents the reader with a preview of this historical progression:
As the main imperial pleasance and the seat of government during 
the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911), the Garden of Perfect Brightness 
ﬂourished for over one hundred and ﬁfty years. Its career as ruins, 
one that is now in its one hundred and thirty-sixth year, has been 
nearly as long. In many ways, the gardenʼs afterlife has been more 
eventful than its imperial heyday.
As this passage suggests, Barmé focuses more on the ruins of the 
Yuanmingyuan than the intact imperial pleasance, although the ambiguity of 
his title, “A Life in Ruins,” suggesting both that the gardenʼs life has been 
ruined and that there is life in the gardenʼs ruins, is in play throughout the 
piece. His emphasis is on the dynamics of the site, not as simply a pristine 
imperial wonderland in the time of Qianlong that was abruptly reduced to ruins 
26in 1860 and then miraculously reconstructed in the 1980s, but rather as a 
living site, constantly changing both materially and in the minds of people, 
sometimes drastically, sometimes gradually, but always changing. 
  Barmé characterizes the initial construction of the Yuanmingyuan not as 
“ the crystallization of the blood and sweat as well as knowledge of the 
multitudes of laboring people” but as a personal project of the self-indulgent 
Manchu emperors, noting, “much that is taken as quintessentially Chinese 
today—by both Chinese and non-Chinese alike—is in reality a conﬂated 
culture born of the Manchus, a foreign, conquering people” (113). He thus 
problematizes the simultaneous interpretation of the Yuanmingyuan as the 
great cultural heritage of the Chinese people and the Manchus as corrupt 
exploiters of the Chinese people. If the Yuanmingyuan and the 
accomplishments of the Qing Dynasty are to be claimed as an essential part of 
Chinese heritage and the Yuanmingyuanʼs destruction a Chinese humiliation, 
then the anti-Manchu sentiment that characterized popular Chinese nationalist 
politics for decades beginning in the late 19th century and framed Manchus as 
foreign exploiters of the Chinese people, must be reconciled with the more 
recent policy that posits Manchus as a Chinese minority group and proclaims 
the period of Manchu rule “our great Qing” (Bulag 7, quoting Lu Xun). From 
this perspective, Yuanmingyuan history exposes an inconsistency in the way 
Chineseness has been presented from past to present. To emphasize this 
inconsistency, Barmé, in his narrative, details the varied inﬂuences that go into 
the building of the Yuanmingyuan—it incorporates styles from other famous 
gardens in China, as well as Western architectural designs and the Manchu 
emperorsʼ architectural fancies—illustrating that, although the Yuanmingyuan 
27later came to be touted as distinctively Chinese, it was, in fact, the product of 
an amalgamation of cultures.  
  Barmé challenges the idea that the Yuanmingyuanʼs destruction was 
predominantly caused by the foreign invasion of 1860 by exploring the various 
phases of destruction to befall the garden over the past century and a half, 
concurrent with political upheavals and societal realities in Chinese history. He 
points out that, even before 1860, parts of the garden were beginning to show 
signs of disrepair (125). The Yuanmingyuan was not burned until half a 
century after its height under Qianlong. In that time, succeeding emperors 
were less enthusiastic about the Yuanmingyuanʼs maintenance and 
expansion, and let parts of it fall into decline while adding new buildings in a 
“stolid traditional mold” (130). 
  The infamous burning of 1860, then, becomes just another phase, 
albeit a rather rapid and severe phase, in the destruction of a garden that had 
already declined in grandeur. The circumstances of the looting and burning of 
the Yuanminyuan related in Barméʼs history differ markedly from the ofﬁcial 
Chinese account. The malicious General Elgin from the 1994 narrative, in 
Barméʼs narrative, undertakes the burning of the Yuanmingyuan with the idea 
“that the emperor Xianfeng in particular, rather than his subjects, should be 
punished for the abuse of the diplomats and his duplicity regarding the peace 
treaty” (131). Elgin thus becomes a more sympathetic ﬁgure who, “at pains not 
to cause egregious harm or offense to the Chinese people,” (133) must give 
the order to loot and burn the Yuanmingyuan, which he later regrets and for 
which he is later censored in Europe. Barméʼs narrative acknowledges the 
barbarity of the looting and burning of the Yuanmingyuan but also criticizes the 
slanted accounts of it promoted in China:
28Although without doubt an act of wanton barbarism, it is revealing that 
in popular Mainland Chinese accounts of the sacking of the palaces 
available to readers since the 1980s, one is hard pressed to ﬁnd any 
mention of the atrocities committed by the Qing negotiators that led to 
this ﬁnal act of vandalism. Nor, in these popular histories, are there 
detailed descriptions of the sly manipulations of the Qing Court in the 
tense days leading up to the sacking. (133).
  Barmé challenges the idea that the burning of 1860 amounted to its 
complete destruction: “although twentieth-century accounts generally claim 
that the area was completely razed, contemporary records claim that the Yuan 
Ming Yuan could have been preserved and repaired without too great an 
effort” (136). In Barméʼs account, the 1860 burning of the Yuanmingyuan is 
only the beginning of a series of disﬁgurements leading to the parkʼs ruined 
condition in the 1950s when “topography alone survived” (Barmé quoting 
George N. Kates). Other destructive periods in the history of the garden that 
Barmé identiﬁes include the exploitation of its resources by the Dowager 
Empress Ci Xi for the building of the [New] Summer Palace (Yiheyuan ၊࿨䭉) 
beginning in the 1890s, the local pillaging that occurred in the aftermath of the 
Boxer Rebellion in 1900, the plunder of stones and wood by warlords and 
ofﬁcials in the ﬁrst three decades of the twentieth century, landscaping for 
farmland beginning in the 1930s and continuing for several decades, and the 
intermittent construction of schools, factories, housing and other buildings over 
land once belonging to the Yuanmingyuan. Even the 1980s “restoration” effort, 
considered a means of preserving the ruins by Chinese involved in the project 
(Yuanmingyuan: Lishi),  Barmé sees as yet another phase in the long history 
of Yuanmingyuanʼs destruction.
  Barméʼs exposition of the various destructive forces contributing to 
Yuanmingyuanʼs decline calls into question the ofﬁcial narrative of 
Yuanmingyuan history that posits the parkʼs destruction as the result of two 
29main events, the ﬁre of 1860 and the plunder of 1900, and thereby opposes 
simplistically blaming the parkʼs destruction on foreign aggression and imperial 
neglect, since the parkʼs destruction is the complex product of a multitude of 
agents. In effect, Barmé overthrows the historical groundwork that makes the 
Yuanmingyuan ruins a perfect object of nationalistic indignation and replaces it 
with a complexity that demands critical analysis.
  Barmé argues that by the 1950s the site of the Yuanmingyuan had lost 
all association with the famed garden; the Yuanmingyuan was forgotten: 
“Indeed, over the years the grounds of the gardens lost virtually all signiﬁcance 
in Chinese life” (144). Not until the 1980s, when the Yuanmingyuan Ruins Park 
was built, was the memory of Yuanmingyuan revived in the popular mind. 
Barmé describes the construction of the park as “the latest phase in the 
devastation of the Yuan Ming Yuan” (142). Fields were dug up, lakes ﬁlled with 
water and trees planted. Tourist elements were introduced such as ticket 
booths, food vendors, gift shops and rental boats resulting in “a garishly 
dolled-up and picturesque socialist park” (142). By exposing the extent to 
which the 1980s construction of the new Yuanmingyuan Park was a brand 
new creation, rather than a renovation, Barmé condemns the historical 
connection to the ancient Yuanmingyuan as an artiﬁcial one, constructed for 
monetary and ideological proﬁt: 
Coming, as it did, at a time when the Communist Party was at pains 
to re-establish its primacy as the embodiment of Chinese patriotic 
sentiment, and anxious to avail itself of the great enterprise of modern 
Chinese history as proof that only under its leadership could the 
wrongs of the past be righted, the Yuan Ming Yuan was subjected to--
taking a phrase from Rose Macaulay--”the destroying hand of ruin-
clearers.” (143).
  By highlighting the myriad transformations that the site where 
Yuanmingyuan once stood underwent, and the new associations it acquired, 
30both physically and in the minds of the populace, Barmé calls into question the 
projected unity between the modern day public park and the historical imperial 
pleasance. He points out that physically, only a few scattered stones and 
columns, some of them recently repositioned to mimic the semblance of the 
long-lost buildings that they were once a part of, remain of the original 
Yuanmingyuan. He thus implies that the more potent connection between the 
Yuanmingyuan of the past and that of the preset is in the perceived 
importance of the site to people today. Throughout his narration of history, 
Barmé exhibits a consciousness of what Ng and Wang call the “presentist 
motives” in how the historical Yuanmingyuan is remembered. He contrasts the 
present national signiﬁcance of the Western Palaces with their disparagement 
by Qianlongʼs successor as “a perversion of natureʼs way” (127-128). He also 
observes how the paintings of the Forty Scenes have come to overshadow 
other historical representations of the Yuanmingyuan by virtue of having been 
widely reproduced on advertisements and mementos targeted at modern 
tourists (129). He notes how the decline and fall of the Qing has come to be 
seen as an “inevitable vector of desuetude” (130). His narrative constantly 
juxtaposes the history he has uncovered with the modern day perceptions of 
that history.
  Yet, clearly Barmé himself also displays presentist motives in his 
unraveling of history. Where the ofﬁcial Chinese narrative foreshadows the 
Yuanmingyuanʼs 1860 looting and burning as the terrible but inevitable fate 
that must befall it, Barméʼs narrative laments the Yuanmingyuanʼs late 
twentieth century transformation into a public park and appropriation as a 
nationalist symbol in a similar fashion. He ends his narrative by expressing the 
hope that the future Yuanmingyuan “may grow from the rancorous conﬁnes of 
31a spiteful and crudely manipulated nationalism to become a ruin of grandeur 
and wonderment” (157).
  In  2006 Barmé wrote an essay entitled “A Year of Some Signiﬁcance,” 
in which he sympathizes with the Chinese intellectual, Yuan Weishi, whose 
“Modernization and History Textbooks” caused the section of the newspaper in 
which it was published to be suspended, as well as other critics of the 
Communist governmentʼs distortion of history and media censorship (See 
Yuan). Barmé concludes: “When it comes to China, there is a lot of history to 
recover before questions of veracity and achievement can be productively 
explored. History might not repeat itself, however the stymieing of basic rights 
means that the histories of years past continue to haunt the present.” This 
statement reveals something of Barméʼs motivations in writing his 
Yuanmingyuan history. The state-promoted 1994 Yuanmingyuan history 
examined in section 1 can be taken as an example of the kind of obfuscation 
of history that Barme denounces. Barméʼs narrative, then, is his attempt to 
uncover historical veracity.
  Nonetheless, there are places in which Barméʼs history opposes the 
Chinese ofﬁcial histories without accounting for other versions or 
interpretations of events. Wong Young-Tsu in his 2001 book, A Paradise Lost: 
The Imperial Garden Yuanming Yuan, gives an account of the 1860 burning of 
the Yuanmingyuan that differs signiﬁcantly in its interpretations from Barméʼs 
account. In Wongʼs narrative the Qing Court representative, Prince Gong, who 
is charged with negotiating peace with the foreigners, desperately tries to 
prevent the calamity of Yuanmingyuanʼs looting and burning by pleading with 
the intransigent Lord Elgin. In contrast, Barméʼs account paints Prince Gong 
as a dirty negotiator who “after numerous prevarications, bluffs and acts of 
32deception on the part of the Qing Court,” takes the members of the English 
and French peace delegation hostage and tortures them. A third account of 
Prince Gong as a traitor to the Qing Empire, which Wong disputes, also exists 
and was popularized in the Zhang Guantian play, “Yuanmingyuan” (See Wong 
139, Cheng 20a and “Garden”).
  Outrage over the poor treatment of English prisoners of war, both the 
Barmé and Wong narratives agree, is the reason behind Elginʼs decision to 
burn the Yuanmingyuan. However, Wong argues that the prisoners, after a 
period in which they were mistreated, were given the treatment of “honored 
guests” under prince Gong in his desire to facilitate peace (138) and returned 
on October 13 as an amiable gesture, but that their return caused Elgin to 
become irrationally angry because “they told their horrible stories of their 
imprisonment, not to mention that some of them did not return alive” (146). 
Wong argues that “the European prisoners were, indeed, being mistreated, but 
they were mistreated by the long-standing Chinese prison system. No 
evidence whatsoever indicates that the Qing authorities, let alone the Xianfeng 
emperor, ever authorized the mistreatment of the European prisoners.” He 
then cites a document from 1860 that stipulates that the prisoners must be 
comfortably provided for and were not to be tortured or humiliated. (148). 
Barméʼs narrative, on the other hand relates, “Of their number eighteen died 
and, when their bodies were eventually returned to the Allied Forces in 
October 1860, even the liberal use of lime in their cofﬁns could not conceal the 
fact that they had suffered horribly before expiring” (131). While Barméʼs and 
Wongʼs accounts do not directly contradict each other factually, each directs 
the readerʼs sympathy towards a different side. Lord Elgin, who is a relatively 
sympathetic character in Barméʼs history, is a tyrant in Wongʼs whose 
33“powerful emotion of anger and self-righteousness” is used to “justify his 
violent action,” and who originally “contemplated not only the demolition of all 
the palaces in and out of Beijing but also the abdication of the Manchu 
monarch Xianfeng” (148). In addition, Wong quotes the reactions of three 
Chinese to the burning of the Yuanmingyuan to give an impression of the 
tragedy of the event to the Chinese people.
  Barméʼs description of what, in China, is notoriously identiﬁed as the 
second burning of the Yuanmingyuan by the imperialist Eight Nation Allied 
Armies in 1900, is conﬁned to one small paragraph and does not mention the 
destruction caused by the foreigners, only the destruction caused by Manchu 
bannermen: 
Following the occupation of the imperial capital by foreign troops, 
soldiers were also billeted in the imperial gardens. Bannerman, whose 
villages surrounded the Yuan Ming Yuan, having found themselves 
defeated and without effective leadership, now formed marauding 
gangs and ransacked the ground in search of proﬁt. They reportedly 
destroyed all of the remaining trees and building of the gardens in the 
space of a month (139). 
Wongʼs account, on the other hand, attributes the greater part of the 
destruction and theft to the foreign invaders who were “even more numerous 
and vicious than those of 1860” (181) and relegates the Manchu bannermen 
and other “native bandits, thieves and riffraff” to opportunistic looters. (182).
  Wong also provides a description of the 1980s park reconstruction 
project that, while for the most part including the same facts as Barméʼs 
history, is sympathetic to the Chinese stateʼs objectives. Wong describes the 
building of the Yuanmingyuan Ruins Park and construction process as a 
necessary step for ruins preservation and a successful tourism venture. About 
the very same event that Barmé explains as “the latest phase in the 
34devastation of Yuanmingyuan,” Wong declares, “No one will dispute the fact 
that the creation of the park has helped historic preservation” (193). 
  Rather than debate which historianʼs Yuanmingyuan history is more 
“correct” and risk becoming embroiled in questions of historicity, I seek to 
contribute to the scholarly discourse of Yuanmingyuan by asking a question 
not speciﬁcally addressed in any of the works related to Yuanmingyuan I have 
covered in this chapter. Both the 1994 Chinese ofﬁcial history and Barméʼs 
history, along with the accounts of virtually every other scholar writing about 
the Yuanmingyuan after the 1980s, agree that the Yuanmingyuan Ruins Park 
was aimed at promoting nationalism. But, why in the 1980s, was the 
Yuanmingyuan, as opposed to other potential nationalist symbols, chosen to 
be a central ﬁgure in the state-supervised campaign to promote nationalism? 
Why invest so much money and so many resources into building the 
Yuanmingyuan Park around ruins that had been neglected and ignored for 
decades? Furthermore, why have the Yuanmingyuan Park and ofﬁcial 
histories promoted in the 1980s been so successful in capturing both national 
and, more recently, international attention?
  Conceptualizing Yuanmingyuan as a place of historical import is not 
sufﬁcient to address these questions because the Yuanmingyuanʼs historical 
import was largely re-constructed in the 1980s along with the physical site of 
the park. Before this time, as Barmé relates in his narrative, (and which is 
corroborated in other sources) the physical site that had once been called 
Yuanmingyuan was claimed by farmland, factories, schools, government 
buildings and landﬁlls and had largely lost its association with the famed 
imperial garden. I propose that collective memory is a more effective 
framework with which to conceptualize the Yuanmingyuan and address these 
35questions because it posits Yuanmingyuan as a changing discourse in which 
shifting collectives participate and accounts for the existence of an idea of 
Yuanmingyuan as ideologically important, even when the Yuanmingyuan as a 
physical site had acquired other associations and most people were not 
actively aware of this idea. Framing the Yuanmingyuan as a collective memory 
allows us to relate the changing material site of the Yuanmingyuan as a body 
of representations to changing mental conceptions of Yuanmingyuan, and 
place both within political contexts. It accounts for the dynamism and multi-
vocality of Yuanmingyuan as an ever-changing and complex discourse. 
Moreover, rather than directing us towards an evaluation of history according 
to standards of objectivity and ﬁdelity, it shifts our historiographical focus to a 
history of ideas, of what is believed in any given time, or what J. Friedman 
calls “fetishism,” which he argues “should not be understood in terms of 
misrepresentation of reality, but as the very form of lived reality itself whose 
representational properties are simply incommensurate with that to which they 
refer” (Friedman 19). In the sense suggested by Friedmanʼs idea of fetishism, 
the collective memory of the Yuanmingyuan at any given point, that is, what 
people believed about it, is more relevant than the siteʼs factual history to 
understanding its signiﬁcance in China.
363. Remembering the Yuanmingyuan: The Ongoing Discourse Between 
Producers, Representations and Consumers
  It is not my intention here to plunge into a deep historical or theoretical 
discussion about collective memory nor do I claim to have the expert 
knowledge to do so. Ultimately, I intend, through a directed application of 
selected scholarʼs theories on collective memory and my own inferences to 
utilize collective memory in my description of the ideologies, opinions and 
notions surrounding the Yuanmingyuan site in Beijing from approximately the 
1980s to the present. Therefore, very brieﬂy and somewhat oversimplistically, 
collective memory, whose ﬁrst use as a term is attributable to Maurice 
Halbwachs (1877-1945) and whose conception has been variously debated 
and reﬁned by subsequent scholars, I take to refer to a shared notion about a 
given subject among a social collective. In my use of the term, I rely heavily on 
an article by Wulf Kansteiner, “Finding Meaning in Memory: A Methodological 
Critique of Collective Memory studies,” in which he proposes that collective 
memory be conceptualized as: 
the result of the interaction between three types of historical factors: 
the intellectual and cultural traditions that form all our representations 
of the past, the memory makers who selectively adopt and manipulate 
these traditions, and the memory consumers who use, ignore, or 
transform such artifacts according to their own interests. (180). 
This triangular model, which can be seen as an adaptation of the rhetorical 
triangle, is by no means a comprehensive model. Nonetheless, I ﬁnd that if 
applied with an awareness of its limitations and in conjunction with other 
theories, it is a useful point of approach for conceptualizing what the historical 
memory of the Yuanmingyuan is and how it is being produced. However, 
37before I begin to inscribe my own arguments onto each of the triangleʼs 
corners, I must identify two principles at its base: 
  1. The collective memory of a thing or event has no deﬁnitive point of 
origination. Although we might suppose that traditions come ﬁrst, and it is 
these traditions that producers utilize in making new representations, the 
traditions themselves must have been at some point produced and producers 
must ﬁrst have been consumers to conceive of them. Even if, for example, we 
say that the Yuanmingyuanʼs construction is the point of origination for the 
idea “Yuanmingyuan”, it is unclear at what point the Yuanmingyuan became 
widely enough known to become a collective memory and what combination of 
representations achieved this, and what representations the producers of 
these representations had themselves consumed; in other words, the 
relationship between the three groups, representation (understood both as 
tradition and its re-presentation, something that is periodically altered), 
producer (the agent that alters the representation) and consumer (the one 
interpreting and remembering the re-presentation) is dialectical. 
  2. Collective memory is not a static and deﬁnable set of ideas, but a 
dynamic web of impressions, a discourse going on among a group about a 
central subject. When I discuss the collective memory of the Yuanmingyuan, I 
am referring to the discourse going on in the minds of people, who form a 
collective by virtue of participating in the discourse, and investigating some of 
the ways in which this discourse was shaped and emerged as an active 
subject.
  In positing the Yuanmingyuan as a collective memory and drawing upon 
Kansteinerʼs model, I seek to overturn the oversimpliﬁcation common in 
descriptions of the present-day Yuanmingyuan Park that posit it as a tool of 
38the Chinese state to promote an “ofﬁcial memory” that inculcates nationalism 
into the Chinese people. In terms of the model, this is equivalent to positing 
the Yuanmingyuanʼs collective memory as a discourse between the producer 
as the Chinese state; the representation as the Yuanmingyuan Ruins Park; 
and the consumer as the Chinese people. 
  It is problematic, on many levels to take “the Chinese state” as an 
organic body with ideological consistent aims and the sole agent behind 
Yuanmingyuan Parkʼs production. If we take the Chinese state as an 
administrative organization, then it is composed of multiple hierarchical 
branches and employs multiple individuals with different responsibilities and 
potentially conﬂicting opinions. It is not “the state” then that acts, but 
individuals that act on behalf of the notion “state”. Even if we wanted to 
propose that it is government ofﬁcials who produce the Yuanmingyuan 
narrative, this too is not quite accurate since many individuals who associate 
themselves with the state approve, alter or censor representations but do not 
necessarily produce them. The planning and construction of the 
Yuanmingyuan Ruins Park, for example, was undertaken by a large group of 
people of different occupations and from different disciplines whose 
disagreements sparked highly publicized and drawn-out debates (See 
Yuanmingyuan: Lishi and Yuanmingyuan: Chongjian). Therefore, the producer 
of the Yuanmingyuan Ruins Park or even the narratives found within it was 
neither unitary nor “the state.” The idea that “the state” is a uniﬁed entity 
governing a nation is itself an imaginary projected by those who claim to act 
on its behalf, a mechanism for legitimization that functions similarly to a 
collective memory in that it derives authority from peopleʼs collective belief in 
it.  
39  It is equally problematic to posit the Yuanmingyuan Ruins Park as a 
single-stranded representation that embodies the producerʼs intentions. The 
actual Yuanmingyuan Ruins Park that opened to the public in 1988 and has 
continued to be expanded since then, occupies a huge space ﬁlled with 
various exhibits, banners, advertisements, images, stands, shops, restaurants, 
natural scenery, works of art and architecture in addition to the ruins 
themselves. In other words, within the park itself is a multitude of 
representations that cannot possibly communicate a uniﬁed and directed 
meaning. Furthermore, an examination of the historical narratives in the park 
shows that although they are certainly historically reductive and their explicitly 
espoused ideological messages may ﬁt under the banner “nationalism,” they 
are, nonetheless, multivocal and have no shortage of internal contradictions, 
as is apparent in the tripartite representation of Yuanmingyuan history I 
outlined in section 1.
  As for the consumers of these representations being “the Chinese 
people,” what collective memory, as a mechanism for creating and reifying 
group unity, reveals, is that “the Chinese people” was never an existing 
collective to begin with except insofar as it is a politically-constituted group or 
an imagined idea. Representations like the ofﬁcial histories of the 
Yuanmingyuan construct ideas of cultural and historical unity and posit them 
as belonging to the whole political collective of Chinese. But the political 
collective is not precisely the consumer of the representation, because the 
consuming collective is deﬁned precisely by who consumes the 
representations, an ever-changing and non pre-determined group. The 
narratives within the Yuanmingyuan park posit the existence of a Chinese 
nation composed of Chinese citizens who share the cultural glory and 
40historical humiliation symbolized by the Yuanmingyuan; in some cases they 
even inclusively address them as “we the Chinese people.” This assumption 
may be accepted and internalized by those who consume the representations, 
but, ultimately, the collective is not determined by the intended target of the 
representations, but is constantly being re-membered based on who is being 
exposed to and accepting the representations. In other words, one only 
becomes “Chinese” by consuming representations that assert oneʼs 
Chineseness and accepting their premise, although the representations 
themselves present “Chinese” as an already-existing inherent quality.
  In short, identifying what the collective memory of the Yuanmingyuan is 
and how it came to be is a much more complicated process than most 
scholars writing about the Yuanmingyuan would care or feel the need to 
undertake. Still, careless references to collective memory, both in discussions 
of the Yuanmingyuan and within topics relating to the humanities in general, 
must be acknowledged and addressed if the Yuanmingyuan on the one hand, 
and collective memory, on the other are to be better understood.
  Jan Assmann, a German egyptologist, reﬁnes Halbwachsʼ original 
concept of collective memory as shared memory among a social group by 
breaking it down into communicative memory or “every day memory,” short-
lived  and disorganized presentist memory referenced through casual 
interactions; and cultural memory, inherited memory that binds a group to a 
speciﬁed past as a means of “concretion of identity” and reiﬁcation of group 
unity. (See Assmann or Kansteinerʼs summary in ““Finding” 182). He further 
subdivides cultural memory into two types: “Cultural memory exists in two 
modes: ﬁrst in the mode of potentiality of the archive whose accumulated 
texts, images and rules of conduct act as a total horizon, and second in the 
41mode of actuality, whereby each contemporary context puts the objectivized 
meaning into its own perspective, giving it its own relevance” (Assmann 130). 
Assmannʼs divisions are useful in historically locating the collective memory of 
the Yuanmingyuan that emerged in the 1980s. The Yuanmingyuan is a site 
with a long physical and representational history dating back to its inception in 
the early 18th century. Various notions of the Yuanmingyuan have waxed and 
waned in and out of popular consciousness at different periods of its history. 
The notion of the Yuanmingyuan that arose in the 1980s was not new in the 
sense that it was predicated upon older notions, what Kansteiner calls 
“tradition” and Assmannʼs “potential cultural memory.” It was new in the sense 
that these traditions or potential cultural memories were re-presented to ﬁt the 
cultural context of 1980s China and the ideological motives of the 
representers. These re-presentations (similar to what Eric Hobsbawn calls “the 
invention of tradition” in his book of the same title) resulted in an active cultural 
memory of the Yuanmingyuan. What is not made clear Assmannʼs discussion 
of the two types of cultural memory is what happens during the transition 
between the deliberate re-presentation of potential cultural memory and its 
solidiﬁcation into active cultural memory. I would argue that in order for active 
cultural memory to exist, the new representation must be accepted by a 
collective, and it is this acceptance, not the presentation itself that deﬁnes an 
active cultural memory as active. In other words, Assmann neglects the role of 
the consumer in constituting collective memory. Perhaps then, it is useful to 
deﬁne a third category of cultural memory, infelicitous (to borrow an adjective 
from J. L. Austinʼs ideas about performativity) cultural memory, that is, 
potential cultural memory that has been re-presented by producers but not 
accepted --either ignored or immediately forgotten—by consumers.     
42  But who identiﬁed “the Yuanmingyuan” as an idea that needed to be 
reinterpreted in the ﬁrst place? Who went about reinterpreting it and who 
ultimately decided upon which reinterpretation to convey to society? The 
collection of essays edited by Rubie Watson in Memory, History, and 
Opposition Under State Socialism construct their arguments about popular 
resistance upon the premise that authoritative socialist states like China 
monopolize on cultural memory by propagating an ofﬁcial narrative of historical 
events and stiﬂing dissident versions. This is a common theme in studies that 
touch upon modern Chinese historical memory, envisioning Communist China 
as the paragon of an authoritative propaganda state.
  Anne-Marie Broudehoux, in a similar vein, observes how the Chinese 
state has appropriated the Yuanmingyuan to convey a speciﬁc politically-
motivated historical narrative: 
Despite the huge criticism of the administrationʼs commercialization of 
the Yuanmingyuan, few observers have objected to the stateʼs 
exploitation of the ruins for patriotic purposes. Seldom disputed are 
the selective version of history and the single-stranded, goal-oriented 
story told by the plaques, ﬁlms, museum exhibits and books displayed 
at Yuanmingyuan (80). 
Both Broudehoux and Watson describe how individuals resist the 
homogenizing force of ofﬁcial history. Watson in her essay, “Making Secret 
Histories: Memory and Mourning in Post-Mao China,” suggests that resistance 
comes from personal memories of historical events that contradict ofﬁcial 
ones. Broudehoux, in her chapter, “Selling the Past: Nationalism and the 
Commodiﬁcation of History at Yuanmingyuan,” suggests that the populace 
resists ofﬁcial memory by embracing alternate associations:
[T]he greatest resistance to the stateʼs narrow reading of the ruins 
comes from the general public. There appears to be a much greater 
willingness on the part of the population to forget and forgive the 
misfortunes of the past, and to embrace the fully global consumer 
43culture, whose hegemony is threatening that of the Chinese 
state” (83). 
However, Haiyan Lee, in presenting her own interpretation of the modern day 
Yuanmingyuan Park, directly objects to Broudehouxʼs implication that holding 
another interpretation of Yuanmingyuan history excludes or subverts the 
nationalistic interpretation promoted by the state:
While there is no doubt that the ofﬁcial narrative tells a reductive story, 
it is a stretch to claim that the ofﬁcial memory is contested by visitors 
just because they pay scant heed to the message-bearing plaques 
and instead take sentimental pleasure in the poetic aura of the ruins 
that seem to connect them to far away landscapes in time and space. 
(183).
  Both Watsonʼs and Broudehouxʼs arguments assume that “the state,” 
as a uniﬁed body, is the producer of an “ofﬁcial narrative” that conveys a 
uniﬁed meaning, which is promoted in the Yuanmingyuan. Government-
sponsored propaganda and media censorship certainly play a major role in 
shaping collective memory in China, however, cultural memory production is 
an extremely complicated process that involves multiple actors and ideas, 
which words like “the state” and “ofﬁcial narrative” do not capture. It would be 
more accurate to say that the design of the Yuanmingyuan and the historical 
narratives in its museums and exhibits were scrutinized, edited and approved 
by motived agents who identiﬁed themselves with the state. While in some 
cases textual histories displayed in the Yuanmingyuan were reprinted word-
for-word in other literature meant for popular consumption, this does not mean 
that every text or other form of media representing the Yuanmingyuan and 
approved by government authorities was ideologically consistent or “single-
stranded,” especially considering the rapidness with which nationalist ideology 
tends to change in China. The actual production of the Yuanmingyuan Ruins 
Park and the historical narratives within it were efforts that had numerous 
44contributors, not all of them afﬁliated with the state, and were informed by 
numerous ideologies, some contradictory.
  Having established this, I want to draw attention to what Leeʼs objection 
brings out about the relationship between the producer of the Yuanmingyuan 
narrative, the ideologically-charged narrative that it creates, and the people 
that consume this narrative. The producer (whether or not it is “the state”), 
does not directly convey a collective memory to the consuming populace. 
Rather, the producer produces a narrative that is embedded with political 
intentions. This narrative is then interpreted by people who, individually, may 
or may not subscribe to those intentions. There is a gap between the 
producersʼ intentions and visitorsʼ reception that leaves room for modiﬁcation 
or alternate interpretations, especially if a visitor has also received 
representations that compete with the ones presented in the park or is 
oblivious to them. State ofﬁcials or other invested individuals may try to stiﬂe 
other representations in order to promote ofﬁcial representations endowed 
with approved intentions, but, as Lee points out, for visitors to ignore these 
intentions and embrace alternate interpretations is not equivalent to 
resistance. To resist the producersʼ intentions would be to identify them and 
deliberately oppose them. Watsonʼs idea of individuals clinging to personal 
memories that contradict state-promoted “ofﬁcial memory” resembles this 
more closely. What Broudehouxʼs idea of “resistance” brings out is the fact that 
producers did not actually create the collective memory of the Yuanmingyuan; 
rather, individuals working on behalf of “the state” widely propagated selective 
representation that encompassed their producersʼ intentions while stiﬂing other 
representations that encompassed other intentions in order to increase the 
likelihood of these approved representations dominating collective memory. 
45Nonetheless, because ﬁrst, consumers have the agency, or we might more 
appropriately say, the necessity, to interpret meanings and second, state 
ofﬁcials are unable to stiﬂe all competing representations, the actual collective 
memory that came to be did not necessarily conform to the producersʼ 
intentions. In this sense “memory production” is an inaccurate mode of 
description, since it is not memory that is produced, but representation, and it 
is through consumption of this and other representations that memory is 
formed.
  The relationship between producer, representation and consumer here 
is analogous to the relationship between author, text and reader developed in 
literary theory, where the intention of the author is not necessarily absorbed by 
the reader since the medium of the text creates a plurality of possible 
meanings that may be interpreted. Collective memory is further complicated by 
the fact that there are a multiplicity of texts by a multiplicity of authors with a 
multiplicity of potential meanings that convey ideas about a given subject. 
When several individuals are exposed to a similar pool of representations 
about a particular subject and form a similar notion about that subject based 
on these representations, they form a collective based on that similar notion, 
and that notion is called collective memory. The interpretive gap that exists 
between the representation and consumption of cultural memory also exists 
between its production and representation. The multivocality of the 
Yuanmingyuan Ruins Park that Lee conceptualizes in terms of simultaneously 
existing differentiated space or “heterotopia” (a Foucaultian term) and 
Broudehoux posits as contradicting “the stateʼs narrow reading of the ruins,” is 
actually a feature of the Yuanmingyuan site as a production, that is, a re-
presentation, an articulation of a preexisting idea, like a text. Its ability to be 
46produced is predicated on it its ability to be interpreted, its not having one 
predetermined meaning. Connecting the corners of the triangle, producer and 
representation, with the process, production (requiring articulation); and the 
corners, representation and consumer, with the process, consumption 
(requiring interpretation) illustrates the fact that memory production is not 
direct, but mediated, and that mediation leaves room for multivocality. 
Conceptualizing the model in terms of dynamic processes also highlights the 
mutability of collective memory as something that is continuously changing as 
a result of the discourse between the three agents, producer, representation 
and consumer.   
   Those acting on behalf of “the Chinese state,” then, were not the sole 
producers of the representations encompassed in the Yuanmingyuan Park 
built in the 1980s, but they nonetheless exercised a major inﬂuence upon how 
the park was constructed, what representations were included in the park and 
the dissemination of these representations to the public.  But why was the 
Yuanmingyuan, as opposed to something else, chosen to be presented as a 
national symbol in the ﬁrst place and why in the 1980s as opposed to in 
another period? In order to answer these questions, I must ﬁrst historicize the 
collective memory of the Yuanmingyuan. The history of the idea, like the 
history of the site, is long and complex, and was, from the early 20th century 
onwards, intimately related to the discourse of national humiliation.
  Paul Cohen in a section of the book China Unbound entitled 
“Remembering and forgetting national humiliation in twentieth-century China” 
describes how popular consciousness towards the discourse of national 
humiliation (guochi ࠃᡄ) waxed and waned in China over the course of the 
20th century, and how this was connected to a persistent concern among 
47intellectuals that the population was forgetting its shameful past. Cohenʼs 
analysis is roughly divided into three chronological periods, each 
encompassing a period of time when national humiliation was felt by 
intellectuals to have been forgotten and the subsequent efforts at revival that 
this sense triggered. I will brieﬂy summarize the main points of Cohenʼs 
narrative, since from the early 20th century onwards, the discourse of 
Yuanmingyuan became intimately associated with the discourse of national 
humiliation and as a result changes in popular consciousness towards the 
Yuanmingyuan were often directly connected to changes in popular 
consciousness towards national humiliation. Although Cohen never uses the 
term “collective memory,” within his chapter he, in effect, describes the 
historical course of the collective memory of national humiliation in China.
  According to Cohen, the Chinese national humiliation discourse was 
introduced in the early 1900s, mainly in the writings of “a small (albeit rapidly 
growing) minority of Chinese intellectuals” (169) in an effort to promote a 
collective sense of Chinese nationalism that they felt was lacking. National 
humiliation in this period referred to the humiliations China suffered at the 
hands of foreigners during the Opium War era. Commemoration of this 
unhappy period of history was meant to inspire outrage at the humiliations 
inﬂicted upon China and a desire to redeem the country, thus promoting a 
sense of national unity among the populace. This popular nationalism 
generally opposed itself to the Manchu state and contributed to the Xinhai 
Revolution of 1911. Japanʼs issuance of the Twenty One Demands in 1915 
sparked popular outrage and national humiliation was subsequently written 
into the Chinese school curriculum. That same year a National Humiliation 
48Day was established and the slogan “never forget the national 
humiliation” (wuwang guochi ໪๨ࠃᡄ) was widely dispersed.  
  Ironically, this contributed to national humiliationʼs loss of vigor as a 
means to promote popular nationalism through the 1920s and 30s, as its 
repeated invocation and utilization for various commercial and political aims 
rendered it trite. In 1927 when the Nationalist Party came to power, it began to 
exercise tight control over National Humiliation Day observances and public 
displays of nationalism, fearing that popular nationalism posed a threat to the 
authority of the state. Despite scholarsʼ persistent laments that the national 
humiliations had been forgotten and calls for revival, there is a sense that 
popular feeling towards the injustices wrought by foreign imperialists continued 
to dampen. 
  National humiliation was, for the most part, forgotten by the end of the 
Cultural Revolution in the 1970s when most of the Opium War generation who 
had experienced the humiliating events directly had grown old or passed 
away. This forgetting was lamented by some intellectuals. It was not until the 
1990s that the narrative of national humiliation was reemphasized by the post-
Mao Communist state to suit the political agendas of the time and again used 
to ﬁre up a state-afﬁliated Chinese nationalism. (For other accounts of national 
humiliation and its signiﬁcance to Chinese nationalism, see James Heviaʼs 
section “National Humiliation (Guochi), Liberation (Jiefang), and the 
Construction of the Patriotic Chinese Subject” in the last chapter of his book, 
English Lessons: The Pedagogy of Imperialism in Nineteenth-Century China; 
and Peter Griesʼ section “A Century of Humiliation” in Chinaʼs New 
Nationalism). The waxing and waning of national humiliation in Chinese 
popular consciousness that Cohen describes can loosely be understood in 
49terms of Assmannʼs division of cultural memory into potential and active 
memory—the ﬁrst a dormant collection of past ideas and the second an idea 
awakened in social consciousness that draws upon the ﬁrst for material but 
manifests presentist views. However, in attempting to concretely apply this 
division to the timeline of the national humiliation narrative a problem of 
deﬁning boundaries emerges.  
  Cohen points out that the “forgetting” of national humiliation to which 
intellectuals so anxiously referred had a different meaning in each time period: 
“at different historical junctures, patriotic intellectuals expressed concern either 
about their countrymenʼs complete indifference to this theme or their inability 
to keep it in focus for more than a short while or, late in the century, their 
fading memory of the imperialist interlude in Chinaʼs recent history” (169). In 
the late Qing (early 1900s) forgetting meant that “Chinese, unlike other people, 
were somehow impervious to national shame” (148). In the early republican 
period (1910ʼs-1930ʼs), with the proliferation of national humiliation media, the 
concern was that Chinese, “erupted in anger for a short time but then promptly 
forgot the source of their anger and retreated to their original condition of 
indifference” (148). From the 1970s, however, when “the humiliations of the 
past were no longer of immediate, personal experience” (148) the problem 
became one of the new generation being literally unconscious of the 
humiliations. As a supplement to these ideas, Cohen also offers one Chinese 
writersʼ assertion that there are two kinds of “not forgetting”: “the easy kind 
conveyed in writing and by word of mouth, and the truly efﬁcacious kind that 
was inscribed in peopleʼs hearts” (156). The three meanings of “forgetting” as 
indifference, short-lived concern, and unawareness prevents a neat 
designation of the humiliation narrative as potential or active memory at any 
50given time period. In practical terms, we might say that a potential memoryʼs 
transformation into active memory seems to be the result of two factors: a 
heightened emotional identiﬁcation with the subject and an expansion in the 
collectivity aware of the subject. 
  Yet, the boundary between the two types of cultural memory remains 
indeﬁnable. Assmann describes active cultural memory as a reshaping of 
potential memory into a contemporary context, but if, as Cohen seems to 
argue, memory is something that is continuously changing, continuously being 
reshaped in a contemporary context (even if that context actually weakens the 
memory), then any attempt to distinguish the temporal phases of a memory as 
potential and active would be somewhat arbitrary. At the same time, Cohenʼs 
account describes the status of the national humiliation narrative in terms of 
three generalizable periods in each of which the memory of national 
humiliation was weak and then gained prominence. If we are to use the term 
“active collective memory” to describe this ascension to prominence then we 
must modify the term to not only imply that a previous memory has been 
reshaped into a contemporary context, but that this has been accompanied by 
an expanding collective of consumers and a heightened emotional feeling 
among the collective towards the subject of memory (although how to 
quantitatively measure this still remains a problem). This can also be 
understood as the requirement that the representation be accepted by the 
consumer, without which we said a collective memory would be infelicitous. 
Then the “forgetting” that Cohen describes in the late Qing and early 
republican eras can be understood as the infelicity of the collective memory at 
those times. These designations are useful in historicizing the collective 
memory of the Yuanmingyuan that became prominent in the 1980s, which will 
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period. 
  Representations of the Yuanmingyuan and opinions about it have 
existed since the original gardenʼs inception in the early 18th century. Court 
artists painted scenes from the Yuanmingyuan and poets, most notably 
Qianlong himself, wrote poems about them. Foreigners who were privileged 
enough to visit the garden also wrote accounts of its splendor. Still, it is difﬁcult 
to assess what the collective memory of the Yuanmingyuan was in the 18th 
and 19th centuries or who constituted the collective that remembered it.  It is 
also unnecessary for the purposes of this paper to pursue this question further. 
(For sources that focus on this period in Yuanmingyuanʼs history see Danby, 
Yuamingyuan: Lishi and Wong). After the burning of the Yuanmingyuan in 
1860, the act was generally condemned in Europe as the needless destruction 
of art, mourned by the imperial family as a personal loss, and lamented in the 
poetry of some Chinese scholars as the loss of a beautiful imperial garden. 
(Wong 164). However, in the immediate aftermath of 1860, there is no 
evidence to suggest that the general populace saw the destruction of the 
Yuanmingyuan as anything other than the destruction of the Manchu 
emperorsʼ pleasance, nor was it yet presented as an affront to the Chinese 
nation as a whole. Min-Chʼien Tyau in his 1922 history, China Awakened, 
argues that it is only in his time that “the people have begun to realize what it 
is to be the citizen of a free and independent sovereign state” where “oneʼs 
family interests no longer are supreme, because the state, not the family, is to-
day paramount” (124) and that in 1860: “most Chinese, when they saw the 
ﬂames of the Summer Palace, read in it not the weakness of China, but the 
decadence of the Manchu house” (183). 
52  A shift in popular perceptions of the event seems to have occurred in 
the early 1900s when, after the further destruction of the garden that took 
place in the aftermath of the Boxer Rebellion, Chinese intellectuals began to 
invoke the Yuanmingyuan in their writings as a concrete symbol of Chinese 
national humiliation in order to promote a feeling of Chinese solidarity that they 
felt was lacking. Republican era nationalists, Liang Qichao and Kang Youwei 
both wrote about the profound sense of shame they felt at viewing 
Yuanmingyuan loot abroad, Liang in 1893 and Kang in the early 1900s. 
(Hevia, “Lootʼs” 336 and English 334). From this period on, the discourse of 
Yuanmingyuan was intimately tied to the discourse of national humiliation and, 
it is because of this link that the Yuanmingyuan was ultimately deemed worthy 
of commemoration in the 1980s. 
  The local looting of Yuanmingyuan valuables in the aftermath of the 
Boxer Rebellion, the ongoing exploitation of Yuanmingyuan building materials 
from the 1870s through the 1930s, and the utilization of the land for farming 
and construction from approximately the 1930s through the 70s all seem to 
indicate that the Yuanmingyuan was not considered worth preserving before 
the 1980s. How do we explain this apparent neglect of the site, knowing also 
that, beginning in the 1900s, Yuanmingyuan was tied to the narrative of 
national humiliation and endowed with national value? Cohen offers a partial 
answer to this at the end of his article, where he points out that the national 
humiliation narrative “did not have the same signiﬁcance or salience in every 
period. Nor, at any given juncture, was it uniformly prevalent among all 
segments of the population, or equally energized even within a given segment 
at all times” (171). In other words, the collective memory was not always 
active, and the collective that remembered shifted in different time periods.  As 
53noted above, in the early 20th century national humiliation was invoked by a 
small group of intellectuals who used the concept to promote an anti-Manchu 
popular nationalism that contributed to the Xinhai Revolution of 1911. The 
ruined Yuanmingyuan in this period was presented by Chinese intellectuals as 
an example of the brutality of the foreigners and the incompetence of the Qing 
regime. The Yuanmingyuan site itself was still under the jurisdiction of the 
Qing government under Cixi, who deemed the site irreparable after the 
destruction wrought in 1900 and continued to exploit it for building materials to 
construct the Yiheyuan.    
  Japanʼs issuance of the Twenty One Demands in 1915, sparked an 
upsurge in popular nationalism and the national humiliation narrative was 
formally taught in school and commemorated on an established National 
Humiliation Day. Yuanmingyuan, as a recent symbol of national humiliation 
was also cited by intellectuals, but they had no control over the physical site of 
the Yuanmingyuan, which was still nominally the property of the last emperor, 
Puyi, after his abdication. Republican authorities and warlords took advantage 
of Puyiʼs weakness to exploit the site, claiming its remaining treasures for 
themselves and taking many of its building materials for use in new 
construction projects. (Wong 183). This examination of history reveals that: 1. 
The memory of Yuanmingyuan in the early 20th century was focused on the 
historical moments of 1860 and 1900 when imperialists had invaded and 
wrought destruction on the site, exposing Chinaʼs weakness. The physical 
state of the Yuanmingyuan was probably not a major consideration in this 
period, and even if it had been, the producers of the Yuanmingyuan narrative 
(intellectuals) did not have any authority over the physical site since the site 
was ofﬁcially under the jurisdiction of the Qing rulers and later exploited by 
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Yuanmingyuan as a site of national humiliation shifted in this time period, 
beginning with only a few intellectuals, expanding to some of the greater 
populace and expanding even more after 1915, but then becoming 
emotionally weaker.  
  In 1924 the Nationalist Army expelled Puyi from the Imperial Palace and 
took over Beijingʼs historical sites, including the physical site of the 
Yuanmingyuan.  As the Nationalist Party consolidated its power in the late 
1920s, the national humiliation narrative was converted from a popular 
movement to an ofﬁcial one. New authorities acting on behalf of the state 
began to supervise National Humiliation Day celebrations and other public 
displays of nationalism in an attempt to exercise control over cultural memory 
production. “The idea wasnʼt to make all memory of Chinaʼs past disappear, 
but rather to assert the stateʼs prerogative to serve as arbiter of what was to 
be remembered--and how” (Cohen 170). In addition to National Humiliation 
Day itself, several speciﬁc humiliating events were commemorated on other 
dates, including the foreign invasions of 1860 and 1900 that resulted in the 
destruction of the Yuanmingyuan. (Hevia, English 334). The new regime, 
however, did not support preservation of the Yuanmingyuan ruins, but 
authorized even more pieces of the site to be sold off for money beginning in 
1928. In 1931 a group of scholars organized an exhibition of Yuanmingyuan 
documents and artifacts and proposed the idea of protecting the ruins of the 
Yuanmingyuan as a means of preserving culture as well as the memory of 
national humiliation (Yuanmingyuan: Lishi 427), but this idea was not pursued 
by the government. Why did members of the Nationalist government, who 
were attempting to legitimate their authority by monopolizing on cultural 
55memory at this point, not see in the Yuanmingyuan site ideological opportunity 
and take steps to preserve it as the post-Mao regime of the 1980s would do 
half a century later? The most direct answer to this is that the presentist aims 
of the time did not call for it. In response to the immediate threat of the 
Japanese, the Nationalist government had shifted the discourse of national 
humiliation to focus speciﬁcally on Japanʼs Twenty One Demands of 1915 as 
the exemplary moment of national shame to be commemorated. Since a 
speciﬁc hatred of the Japanese was deemed more useful than a general 
hatred of the foreign imperialists in this period, the burning of the 
Yuanmingyuan was no longer the central symbol of imperialist aggression. 
Preserving the site of Yuanmingyuan was not deemed necessary for 
promoting the national humiliation narrative, especially since the site had 
already been unproblematically neglected for several decades.  
  Beginning in the 1930s the site of the Yuanmingyuan was steadily 
converted to farmland and utilized for new construction projects, causing it to 
become further distanced from its associations with either the Qing imperial 
garden or national humiliation. In the midst of the Second Sino-Japanese War 
(1937-1945), the national humiliation narrative continued to focus on the 
historical moment of the Twenty One Demands and the Chinese population 
continued to be more-or-less unimpressed by repeated references to national 
humiliation in the media. Cohen, re-articulating an idea proposed by Prasenjit 
Duara, states: “Nationalist ideals are kept alive and become part of a personʼs 
sense of self via such mechanisms as the formal education system. But in 
peopleʼs actual lives these ideals often retreat into a passive mode and are 
given active expression only under special circumstances” (164). But what is 
the ideal of nationalism, what causes it to retreat, and what are the special 
56circumstances under which it is given expression? These problems can be 
addressed by looking at nationalismʼs relationship to collective memory. 
  In exploring this relationship, I will use Naoki Sakaiʼs conception of 
nationalism developed in his essay, “Nationality and the ʻMother Tongue,ʼ” in 
the context of 20th century Japan, a concept which, I argue, is equally 
applicable to 20th century China: “Nationality is constituted through 
representations of community conveyed through a regime of fantasies and 
conceptual forces; it is the sentimental feeling of the “we” enabled by these 
regimes within modern national communities” (3). If we take the 
“representations of community” that Sakai refers to as the representations that 
inform the collective memories of consuming collectives, then nationalism is 
the feeling embedded within these collective memories. To selectively reframe 
Sakaiʼs argument in the context of collective memory: nationalism is foremost 
a feeling; it is an emotional identiﬁcation with a presumed national collective 
that comprises the nation based on a feeling of common cultural and historical 
heritage. But the collective that actually forms the nation is politically 
constituted and has no innate culture or history in common to keep it united. 
As Sakai puts it: “there is no reason whatsoever that culture must symbolize 
ethnos or nation in the absence of a discourse that attributes certain cultures 
to ethnic or national identity” (13). Collective cultural memories create the 
notion of a national collective with a common culture and history, thereby 
promoting nationalism and reifying the unity of the nation.  Because of the 
limitations of the mechanism of representation, the collectives that consume 
these cultural memories are not necessarily equivalent to the whole political 
collective that forms the nation, nor is it a preexisting national collective that 
consumes cultural memory; rather, shared cultural memories are what 
57constitute the national collective. It is nationalism, the feeling of cultural 
identiﬁcation with China and Chinese, that projects the notion that a collective 
culture and a collective memory of that culture are shared by an entire national 
collective. 
  The mechanisms Cohen refers to that keep nationalism alive are the 
representations that produce cultural memory. Cultural memories promote 
nationalist sentiment, but expression of this sentiment only occurs when a new 
event recalls these memories in the context of their immediate relevance to 
the present. For example, the memory of the burning of the Yuanmingyuan as 
a national humiliation may promote, in someone who identiﬁes themselves as 
Chinese, a feeling of nationalism, but this nationalism only warrants 
expression when something new happens that recalls the memory and gives it 
new meaning, like the public auctioning of items that were looted from the 
Yuanmingyuan at the time of its burning in 1860 (I will explain this further in 
section 5). The reason that the Twenty-One Demands inspired strong 
nationalist sentiment in the immediate aftermath of the event in 1915, but this 
sentiment did not persist through the ensuing years, is that in 1915, the event 
was new and immediately relevant, whereas by the 1920s it had lost its 
presentist grounding.  
  Christopher Hughes in his article, “Interpreting Nationalist Texts: a post-
structuralist approach,” addresses the elusiveness of a comprehensive 
deﬁnition of Chinese nationalism, showing that it was never a uniﬁed idea, but 
always discursive—attaching itself to a vast assortment of often contradictory 
ideologies, jargon and images at different times and among different 
collectives. Positing nationalism as a feeling embedded within cultural 
memories helps explain this versatility; in order for nationalist sentiment to 
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associated with new ideas relevant to each given time period and the target 
collective being addressed, thus nationalism over the years acquired many 
different associations based on the groups that absorbed cultural memory and 
the relevant politics of each time period.
  This hypothesis can be applied to the emergence of Yuanmingyuan into 
popular consciousness in the 1980s. The idea that the burning and looting of 
the Yuanmingyuan by foreigners in 1860 and 1900 was a national humiliation 
was an old trope with roots in the nationalist movement of intellectuals in the 
1900s. The desire to revive the memory in a present context came out of the 
perceived need to promote nationalism in the 1950s after the new Communist 
regime had come to power and needed to establish itself as the legitimate 
head of a uniﬁed nation, China:
The constitutive role of national humiliation and its resulting anti-
imperialism were, therefore, the central element in the construction of 
a new China by Chinese communists. Indeed, one might argue that 
the very foundation of the Peopleʼs Republic was established on the 
unity forged through liberation (jiefang) from humiliations of Western 
imperialism. (Hevia, English 334). 
Reconstructing the Yuanmingyuan was a concrete means to revive the 
narrative of national humiliation and posit the new era as an era in which 
China as a uniﬁed nation with a shared history and culture had been liberated 
from this humiliation under the new leadership. However, due to political 
interruptions and practical difﬁculties, this project took several decades to 
come to fruition.
  In 1951, just two years after the founding of the Peopleʼs Republic of 
China, Premier Zhou Enlai expressed a desire to preserve the Yuanmingyuan 
ruins and rebuild the garden when the means to do so were found. In other 
59words, Zhou, a prominent government leader, recognized the ideological value 
in Yuanmingyuan. His wish to protect and renovate the ruins was a wish to 
preserve and revive the Yuanmingyuanʼs memory for nationalistic purposes. 
Although a substantive revival of the park did not take place until more than 
three decades later, and although what the speciﬁc ideological messages of 
the Yuanmingyuan were to be had not yet been hammered out, it was at this 
point that Zhou publicly recognized the Yuanmingyuanʼs  potential value to the 
idea of nationhood in the new Peopleʼs Republic of China, put the utilization of 
Yuanmingyuan on the political agenda and thus brought Yuanmingyuan back 
to social consciousness, kindled the ﬂame that would become the Chinese 
peopleʼs new memory of the infamous Yuanmingyuan.  
  Starting in 1956, in response to Zhouʼs proposal and environmental 
concerns about the dying ecosystem around the Yuanmingyuan, the Beijing 
Municipal government requisitioned the land, designated it for cultural 
protection and tried to refurbish its plant life. It is arguable whether the 
Yuanmingyuan was completely forgotten in the 1960s and 70s as Barmé 
suggests, but this short-lived preservation attempt was undone as crop 
shortages compelled an increasing number of people to reoccupy the land for 
farming in the late 1950s and early 60s . Reforestation efforts were halted in 
1961. They were not renewed for almost two decades because of the advent 
of the Cultural Revolution, which dominated Chinese politics and society from 
1966-1976.  Afterwards in 1976, a block of land encompassing many of the 
Yuanmingyuan ruins was put under the jurisdiction and protection of the 
Yuanmingyuan Management Bureau and preservation efforts were renewed. 
In 1977, ﬁve pieces of stone from a Yuanmingyuan fountain and two marble 
tripods that had been lying around the grounds of Beijing University were 
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time that anything had been deliberately returned to the Yuanmingyuan, 
signifying the siteʼs new status as a part of cultural heritage to be preserved 
rather than exploited. In the next two years, teams began to tidy up  some of 
the ruins. Vice Premier Gu Mu came to inspect the site in February of 1979, 
and in November of the same year, a history exhibit was open to visitors. 
Yuanmingyuan was also designated as an important site for protecting cultural 
artifacts. However, these small-scale renovations were not enough to affect 
the targeted national collective. In order to attract large-scale popular attention 
and deliver a political message that would be collectively remembered by most 
of the nation, the Yuanmingyuan had to become something worth seeing, 
something that would incite emotion, a real national monument.  
  In 1980 the ﬁrst serious discussions about how to accomplish the 
monumentality of the Yuanmingyuan began (Yuanmingyuan: Lishi, Wong 
187-188). Participants in these discussions included scholars, architects, 
environmentalists and government ofﬁcials. While opinions differed about to 
what extent and how the area should be refurbished, it was unanimously 
agreed that the ruins should be preserved for their cultural signiﬁcance and 
value to the Chinese nation. There were many ideas about what the 
renovation of the ruins would accomplish. The primary aims ultimately agreed 
upon are summarized nicely in a 1986 article, “A New Phase Beginning the 
Protection, Renovation and Use of the Yuanmingyuan Ruins”: “All along, the 
objectives for renovating the Yuanmingyuan were to make Yuanmingyuan 
become an important site for advancing patriotic education, tourism of sights in 
the capital, research on Chinese traditional gardens, and interaction about 
international history and culture” (“Kaichuang Yuanmingyuan Yizhi Baohu, 
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໘  in Yuanmingyuan: Lishi 535. Also see Yuanmingyuan: Lishi 593-594 and 
the epilogue in Wong).
  Yuanmingyuan had long been linked with national humiliation, but the 
narrative to which Yuanmingyuan was linked in the 1980s and 90s was 
signiﬁcantly different than the narrative to which it had been linked in the early 
1900s because the political aims it was to accomplish were different. Cohen, 
in discussing national humiliation, identiﬁes two major ways in which the 
narrative of the 1990s was different from that of previous ages: 1. It 
emphasized Chinese victimization by imperialists and Chinaʼs heroic 
resistance, rather than Chinese deﬁciencies. 2. It presented the humiliations 
as something of the past that had been redeemed instead of something in the 
present to be redeemed. The emergent narrative of the Yuanmingyuan in the 
1990s supports Cohenʼs description of these new emphases in the national 
humiliation narrative: 1. Elaborate accounts of the glory of the original 
Yuanmingyuan were juxtaposed with the violence of Yuanmingyuanʼs burning 
in 1860, emphasizing imperialist brutality rather than Chinese deﬁciency. 2. A 
third phase of Yuanmingyuan history, the renovation of the Yuanmingyuan 
ruins and opening of the Yuanmingyuan Ruins Park was presented as a 
symbol of China having left behind the era of humiliation and emerged as a 
rich and powerful modern nation under the Communist government. 
  This second change served to project the new Communist government 
as the heroic leader of a Chinese people that had always been great, but had 
been victims of both the old Manchu regime and the foreign imperialists. This 
was entirely different from the nationalist ideas promoted by intellectuals in the 
early 1900s that emphasized, ﬁrst, the need for reform of Chinese culture itself 
62as one of the causes of defeat by the West, and, second, the need for a new 
regime to replace the incompetent Qing state. Late Qing incompetency was 
certainly renewed as a theme in the 1980s narrative, but its purpose was to 
legitimate the current regime as worthy by contrast. Unlike the nationalist 
narratives that originated with intellectuals in the 1900s, the 1980s 
Yuanmingyuan narrative was overseen by state-afﬁliated groups as a means 
to promote ofﬁcial nationalism, as the narrative of the Twenty One Demands 
had been overseen by the Nationalist Government in the 1920s and 30s. In 
the 1990s, the Yuanmingyuan Ruins Park became part of a “patriotic 
education” campaign meant to reinvigorate the populace after the death of 
Mao with a new sense of Chineseness that did not rely as heavily on Marxist 
ideology. 
  The idea of Yuanmingyuan functioning as a tourist site reﬂects the post-
Mao China upsurge in commercial projects meant to promote economic 
growth. Broudehoux in The Buying and Selling of Post-Mao Beijing, describes 
how the construction of the Yuanmingyuan Ruins Park, among many other 
1980s and 90s construction projects, ﬁt with a new demand for consumerism 
and tourism that accompanied the periodʼs rapid economic growth. She dubs 
the parkʼs orientation towards tourism the “commodiﬁcation of history.” Many 
proponents of the Yuanmingyuan Ruins Parkʼs construction saw it as an 
economic venture as much as a means to promote nationalism. 
  The third and fourth major aims of the Yuanmingyuan park construction 
project to promote “research on Chinese traditional gardens” and “interaction 
about international history and culture” are closely related. As far back as the 
aftermath of the Opium Wars, there had been a persistent concern that 
Chinese cultureʼs inferiority was the root cause of Chinaʼs defeat by the foreign 
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traces of traditional Chinese culture during the Culture Revolution of the 1960s 
and 70s. However, in the 1980s and 90s, a sudden reversal occurred. Along 
with the emergence of the state-legitimating idea that China had been 
redeemed from past humiliations, a concerted effort to assert Chinaʼs place 
among the other modern nations of the world, no longer as an inferior subject 
but as a powerful nation-state, began. In an age where national identity was 
validated by the notion of a shared culture and history, this meant that China 
had to reacquire a celebrated cultural tradition. Five thousand years of 
Chinese history and culture were thus reclaimed (and to some extent 
fabricated) in representations promoting cultural memory. The project of 
researching the original Yuanmingyuan as an exemplar of the traditional 
Chinese art of garden construction, a technology, which at the time far 
surpassed that of the West, contributed to the reclamation of culture that 
would boost Chinese nationalism and help prove Chinaʼs qualiﬁcation as a 
civilized nation-state. 
  This in turn fed into an increasingly hot international discourse about 
“world heritage,” where each nation would showcase its artistic, architectural, 
natural and historical monuments and artifacts to the rest of the world with the 
understanding that all were part of a shared human culture. Ironically, this 
utopian ideal fed the competitive desire for each nation to use such “cultural 
relics” as a means to assert the superiority of its own nationality. China, too, 
joined the competition and began to renovate, and in some cases create sites 
that could be showcased as Chinese heritage sites. The Yuanmingyuan Park 
was absorbed into this project. (A more detailed discussion of this ensues in 
section 5).
64  If the construction of the new Yuanmingyuan Ruins Park and the 
historical narrative it communicated were meant to serve all of these aims --
nationalistic, economic, cultural and international, which, while all in their own 
way tied to a broad idea of national progress, were different and complex, how 
was it possible to convey a uniﬁed and clear message for popular 
consumption? One of the implications of the diversity and complexity of aims 
that went into the construction of the Yuanmingyuan Park, is that neither the 
producers of the park, nor the ofﬁcial narrative they promote, were as uniﬁed 
and directed as many critics of the Yuanmingyuan parkʼs single-stranded 
nationalistic propaganda seem to suggest. Although the overarching goal of 
Yuanmingyuan was “nationalism,” and the historical narrative to which it was 
attached was historically reductive, the various ideologies to which nationalism 
was tied at the time caused the Yuanmingyuan Park as a representation to be 
anything but straight-forward. What the Yuanmingyuan should represent and 
how it should represent it were the subjects of discourse among a large group 
of scholars, politicians, environmentalists and architects in the 1980s. Further 
debates about how the Yuanmingyuan Park should be expanded and whether 
the original Qing dynasty pleasance should be reconstructed or not continued 
throughout the 1990s and early 21st century. The construction plan that was 
approved for execution by the Beijing municipal government in 1983 and 
executed over the next several years was already an amalgamation of 
somewhat varied ideological expressions.
  Furthermore, the practical, environmental and logistical demands of 
actually building a park in a given space with a limited budget were also 
prominent subjects of discourse and played a major role in the way the park 
was presented. No matter how rigorously the construction of the park was 
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park, as a translation of an already multivocal vision, could not ensure a 
communication of all that was intended. Even after the parkʼs public opening in 
1988, renovations and expansions continued and temporary exhibitions were 
set up, all manifesting presentist aims. Not only does this problematize the 
notion of a unitary idea, “ofﬁcial nationalism” being promoted by an organic 
body, “the State” through the representation of the Yuanmingyuan Park, but it 
makes any sort of standardized popular reception nearly impossible.   
   The modern day Yuanmingyuanʼs supersaturation of meaning, or 
existence as a “heterotopia,” as Haiyan Lee describes it, applying a term from 
Foucault, seems to be the product, at least partially, of the fact that the 
intentions that went into the building of the Yuanmingyuan were overly 
complex and actually inhibited a simple articulation in the structure and an 
unproblematic absorption by the populace. This is perhaps one reason why 
the memory of Yuanmingyuan today is, once again, becoming infelicitous. 
Haiyan Lee criticizes collective memory as a theory that lacks the ability to 
capture the plurality of simultaneous meaning encompassed in the site of 
Yuanmingyuan: 
Collective memory provides an insufﬁcient analytical framework 
because it privileges diachrony over synchrony, and time over space. 
It speaks only to the monumental dimension of Yuanmingyuan, thus 
implicitly endorsing the anti-restorationistsʼ desire to make it a strictly 
symbolic space whose value is bounded up with the past (184). 
But the Yuanmingyuanʼs supersaturation of meaning does not, as Lee claims, 
suggest that collective memory is an insufﬁcient framework through which to 
conceptualize it. Rather, it suggests that collective memory, which 
encompasses both time and space, has been misapplied or misunderstood in 
its previous associations with the Yuanmingyuan. Leeʼs criticism amounts to a 
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privilege diachrony over synchrony. This is not to say that the concept of 
heterotopia with its spatial emphasis or other concepts are invalid modes of 
description for the Yuanmingyuan. However, I maintain, collective memory is 
an effective framework for understanding how the material site of the 
Yuanmingyuan as a representation relates to the mental conceptions of 
Yuanmingyuan embedded in memories and how these memories are socially 
affected in political contexts.   
  Even if the overarching intent of Yuanmingyuanʼs planners was to 
convey a singular monumentality that emerged through a sense of linear 
historical progression, the actual memory of the Yuanmingyuan in the minds of 
the people is both discursive and heterogeneous. A conception of the 
Yuanmingyuan that equates producersʼ intentions with consumersʼ memory 
without considering the mediation of an interpretable and multi-faceted 
representation is an insufﬁcient model for understanding Yuanmingyuanʼs 
complexity. Collective memory identiﬁes similar strands in the memories of 
people, who through this similarity form a collective. The task of the scholar 
who uses collective memory to conceptualize these similarities is then to 
explore the representations and social interactions that may have contributed 
to them. “Collective” does not deny heterogeneity or suggest teleology. It is a 
description of the symptom of associative similarity within memory, one that 
can be explained by examining the social communications that inﬂuence 
memory formation. “Memory” also does not imply that it is complete memories 
that are similar; if we want to be more precise we should say that what is 
similar is not whole memories but the part of the memory that is associated 
with a speciﬁc subject. For example, when I say the word “Yuanmingyuan”, the 
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Yuanmingyuan will instantly be bombarded with memories that have 
association with the signiﬁer, whereas people outside the collective would not 
have these memories to which they could refer. Individuals within the collective 
might have different memories attached to the word, “Yuanmingyuan,” but the 
overarching sense of what Yuanmingyuan is would be very similar. This 
similarity can be accounted for by a pool of widely publicized and dispersed 
representations, and these representations, can, in turn, be traced back to 
producers with speciﬁc ideological intentions. Of course, what actually occurs 
is a much more complex and non-linear dialogue between producers, 
representations and consumers. The thing called “collective memory” is not 
actually a speciﬁc group of memories that is shared, but similar associations 
about a given subject embedded within the memories of multiple individuals. 
Thus, the term “memory” when applied to a collective is metaphorical. 
  The historicization of the collective memory of the Yuanmingyuan from 
the 1900s to the 1980s that I attempted in this section has major implications 
for the concept of collective memory itself. It exposes the unclear boundary 
between Assmannʼs ideas of potential and active collective memory, since 
collective memory is always in ﬂux. What is changing is not only what is being 
remembered, or the content of the collective memory, and who is 
remembering, or the collective, but also the degree of emotion connected to 
the remembering. The history of the Yuanmingyuan Ruins Parkʼs gradual 
production suggests that a body of representations can have multiple 
producers with multiple intentions, which further contributes to the 
representationsʼ inherent multivocality. 
68  In the next section I will examine the consumer of the Yuanmingyuan 
park (the park being understood as a body of representations contributing to 
the collective memory of the Yuanmingyuan) in order to support the argument 
developed in this section that the collective that remembers a cultural memory 
is not the same as either the producersʼ target collective or the ideological 
group whose unity the cultural memory is meant to reify. This problematizes 
Assmannʼs notion that cultural memory serves the purpose of “concretion of 
identity” from which a group derives awareness of unity, by showing that the 
group is constituted and uniﬁed by the shared memory itself; there is no 
preexisting uniﬁed group except in the imagination of those who have 
consumed the cultural memory.
694. The Collective that Remembers, Its Imagined Identity and Why It 
Forgets
  In the last section I examined the production in the 1980s of the 
Yuanmingyuan Park as a representation, the older ideologies it built upon, its 
historical and political contexts and the ideological intentions that went into it. 
In section 1, I presented a 1994 history of the Yuanmingyuan that is 
representative of other ofﬁcial histories written from the 1980s to the present, 
and in section 2, I introduced a text counter to this, one not only “unofﬁcial,” 
but that sought to undermine some of the speciﬁc ideological agendas of the 
ﬁrst. These three sections have contributed to addressing the production of 
Yuanmingyuan memory as a process enacted by producers through the 
medium of representations. In this section, I will address the third and most 
ethereal side of Kansteinerʼs triangle: the consumer of these representations. 
  However, before I begin I must draw attention to the practical difﬁculties 
of gauging what people in the consuming collective think about 
Yuanmingyuan, how they feel and what combination of representations 
resulted in these thoughts and feelings. The scope of memory, as something 
spanning through time and space, is very large, the consuming collective itself 
is unstable and individual responses to representation are colored by various 
factors. To boast a deep understanding of what the collective memory of the 
Yuanmingyuan is today would require me to conduct a detailed ethnography 
over a long period of time and involve rigorous data collection, a task, that, 
unfortunately, does not ﬁt the scope of this paper. Still, based on my extensive 
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some hypotheses about this elusive question.  
  The difﬁculty of trying to concretely pinpoint and articulate what the 
collective memory of the Yuanmingyuan actually is became apparent to me 
when I was researching the Yuanmingyuan in China over several months in 
the summer of 2009 and the winter of 2009-2010. Yet, as I talked to dozens of 
Chinese people about the Yuanmingyuan, both on and off-site, in Beijing and 
in two other major Chinese cities, Hangzhou and Shanghai, I was increasingly 
convinced that an observable collective phenomenon existed, a phenomenon 
that was taken for granted by my interlocutors, although conceived of as 
“common knowledge” not “collective memory.” From the numerous 
conversations I had in which I casually mentioned that I was studying the 
Yuanmingyuan without explicitly pushing it as a subject of conversation, I 
began to notice two very interesting patterns: ﬁrst, every single person I talked 
to (all part of the urban population, including students, taxi drivers, restaurant 
owners, hotel staff etc.) recognized the name “Yuanmingyuan.” Whether or not 
they were clear about its history or had been to the present day park, they had 
all heard of it, knew, to some extent, what it was. This was not the case with 
my American peers and acquaintances (who were mainly in China for the 
purpose of studying Mandarin), most of whom neither knew what the 
“Yuanmingyuan” or “Old Summer Palace” were, although almost all had heard 
of the [New] Summer Palace (Yiheyuan ၊࿨䭉). Second, to my mention of 
Yuanmingyuan, every Chinese person who pursued the subject in our 
conversation responded with a reference either to the present day site such 
as, “Oh, have you been there?” or a reference to the history of the place such 
as “Oh, the place that was burned by the foreigners?” In other words, the two 
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public park and as a historical place, and often the two connotations were 
intermingled. 
  Sometimes I pursued the ﬁrst association by asking those who had 
been to the site what they thought of it. Responses ranged from, “itʼs a 
beautiful place,” to “the ruins are really interesting,” to “thereʼs not really much 
to see.” I found that there was a signiﬁcant difference in response between 
Chinese tourists, who came from outside of Beijing to see the infamous ruins 
of the Western Palaces (which requires an extra ticket fee) and would often 
gloss over the rest of the enormous park, and local Beijingers, who mostly 
went to enjoy the natural beauty of the larger park, either glossing over the 
ruins or ignoring them entirely (opting not to pay the extra ticket fee). Among 
Beijingers, who comprised more than half of my conversants, there was also a 
noticeable difference in perspective between people of different generations. 
Most of the middle-aged to elderly people I talked to who had been to the site 
responded, “Of course Iʼve been to the Yuanmingyuan!” A few young people in 
their twenties I talked to, on the other hand, complained of the high ticket 
prices to view the ruins and dismissed the place as somewhere for history 
enthusiasts. My sample was too small and disorganized to draw any ﬁrm 
conclusions, but we might speculate that difference in regard towards the 
Yuanmingyuan between the young and old indicates that popular reception of 
the Yuanmingyuan park has changed from the 1980s to the present.
  When I asked people about the history of the Yuanmingyuan, the 
response I received often preserved a common theme along the lines of, 
“everyone knows the place was burned down by the foreigners,” and yet when 
I pressed for details, several people confused the history of the Yuanmingyuan 
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the Yiheyuan (built at the command of the Dowager Empress Cixi in the late 
19th century). Also a point of confusion for many was whether the park had 
been burned down by the French and English Allied Armies (yingfa lianjun ӳ
๏৳फ) or the Eight Nation Allied Armies (baguo lianjun ീࠃ৳फ) and around 
what time frame this had been. 
  The Yuanmingyuan being conceived of both as a present day public 
park and as a historical imperial garden that was burned down is, on the 
surface, neither problematic nor contradictory if we compare it to other sites of 
historical interest like the Parthenon or Gettysburg and speculate that all such 
sites must have changed before and since the historical horizon for which they 
are primarily remembered. What is relevant, though not necessarily unique, to 
the Yuanmingyuan as a site of collective memory is that between being the 
imperial garden that was burned down (originally the garden was three parks, 
one of which was called “Yuanmingyuan,” but they were later taken as 
sections of a single park called “Yuanmingyuan”) and the modern day public 
park (the entire park is commonly called “Yuanmingyuan” but the section 
containing the ruins of the Western Palaces is called “the Yuanmingyuan 
Ruins Park” and sometimes “Yuanmingyuan” actually refers to this), the two 
most memorable parts of its history, there was a period of time in which it was 
not widely remembered as the “Yuanmingyuan”, but was nameless and 
unbounded land that was divided, used and named for various purposes like 
farming. In other words, there is discontinuity in the use of the name 
“Yuanmingyuan” which leads us to epistemological and etymological questions 
about what constitutes the unity of the subject, Yuanmingyuan, and whether 
the name “Yuanmingyuan” should be taken as referring to one evolving site in 
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questions any further, but want to note that the word “Yuanmingyuan” 
generally has as least two referents and that this problem would not exist if the 
present day public park were called something else. The narrative promoted 
within the park suggests that its producers intended for the modern day park, 
as a representation meant to spread cultural memory, to be interpreted as one 
evolving site.  
  Jan Assmannn makes a division in collective memory between what he 
calls communicative memory and cultural memory that is relevant to this 
discussion. Communicative memory has a “limited temporal horizon” (127) 
and is “based exclusively on everyday communications” which are 
characterized by a “high degree of non-specialization, reciprocity of roles, 
thematic instability and disorganization” (126). Cultural memory, on the other 
hand, has a ﬁxed temporal horizon that is distanced from the every day. 
Assmann characterizes it in 5 ways, by its: 1. “concretion of identity” or ability 
to reify group unity, 2. “capacity to reconstruct” or its ability to relate to a 
contemporary situation, 3. “formation” or objectivization of communicated 
meaning, 4. “organization” as something institutionalized, and 5. “obligation” 
as a system of values. (Assmann 130-131, also see Kansteinerʼs summary in 
“Finding” 182). 
  By this division, we might categorize the modern day Yuanmingyuan 
Park as a subject of communicative memory and the imperial garden, 
Yuanmingyuan that was burned down as a subject of cultural memory. 
Assmann asserts that “the transition [between everyday communication and 
objectivized culture] is so fundamental that one must ask whether the 
metaphor of memory remains in any way applicable” (128) to which, of course, 
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fundamental distinction is not so obvious because the cultural memory was 
revived by means of communicative memory. People went as tourists to the 
heavily advertised and very modern Yuanmingyuan Park where the historical 
imperial garden and its destruction were represented as part of their national 
cultural heritage and history. The Yuanmingyuan Park served simultaneously 
as a place for everyday enjoyment and as a national monument; thus it was a 
place where communicative memory and cultural memory could both be 
formed without clear distinction. The Yuanmingyuan presents a problem for 
Assmannʼs distinction between communicative and cultural memory because it 
illustrates that the two affect each other and can overlap; it thus challenges the 
validity of making a distinction. Assmann argues that “no memory can 
preserve the past,” therefore one of the deﬁning characteristics of cultural 
memory is that it “relates its knowledge to an actual and contemporary 
situation” (130). In the case of the Yuanmingyuan, the cultural memory of the 
historical garden as a symbol of national humiliation was infused in the public 
park when it was built, but, at the same time, the new park was incorporated 
into the historical narrative so that it too took on historical and cultural 
signiﬁcance as a symbol that national humiliation had been redeemed. As part 
of its project to become a symbol of progress, not separate from it, the 
Yuanmingyuan park sold itself as a place that the populace could come to for 
leisurely enjoyment. It posited itself, on the one hand, as a site of cultural 
memory, marking the new historical horizon of Chinese modernity in the 
present, and, on the other hand, as a site of communicative memory where 
people could come for casual enjoyments. In other words, part of the historical 
horizon to be remembered was located in the present, which problematizes 
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as distant. 
  In terms of Kansteinerʼs triangle, old representations are re-formed by 
producers with presentist ideas to produce new representations. These new 
representations, the revisions of older ones, communicate to consumers in the 
present about a reconceptualized past while masking this reconceptualization, 
passing this past off as the always-having-existed past. In this way the 
communicative memory (notion resulting from casually remembered 
representations—conversations, TV programs, books etc.—about a given 
subject) actually is the cultural memory, which disguises itself as a memory of 
the past, when it is in fact a memory of the present take on the past. The 
fundamental ﬂaw in Assmanʼs idea of cultural memory, then, is that he views it 
as memory of the past inﬂuenced by the present, when, in fact, it is memory of 
the present inﬂuenced by the past.
  The consumer of collective memory has no access to history except 
through how history is presented in the present (unless he has directly 
experienced the past, in which case, his personal memory is likely to be 
different from or retrospectively reshaped by the collective memory). The 
agency of the producer lies in the fact that his representation is in no way 
bound to any real objective past, although, if his new representation is to be 
successfully presented to consumers as history, he must be aware of extant 
representations, particularly the widely-accepted ones (traditions) whose 
authority can help his representation be accepted by consumers as cultural 
memory. This is precisely why new representations that aim to create cultural 
memory generally base themselves on older ones. The “ofﬁcial” memory of the 
Yuanmingyuan, that is, the memory that was encouraged by representations 
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reinforce state legitimacy, is a product of this principleʼs application. In 
exploring how the consumption of representations resulted in a collective 
memory of the Yuanmingyuan, our question then becomes: to what extent was 
the ofﬁcial memory felicitous?  More concretely, we can ask: how effective has 
the Yuanmingyuan Park been as a representation intended to promote a 
cultural memory that inspires nationalism?
   Since we have established that it is difﬁcult to gauge the thoughts and 
feelings of people in the remembering collective, a more practical but indirect 
way of addressing this question is to look at representations produced after 
the Yuanmingyuan Park brought the idea of Yuanmingyuan into the center 
stage of popular consciousness in the 1980s. These new representations can 
be seen both as products of and additions to the discourse that constitutes the 
collective memory of Yuanmingyuan. They are the products of people who ﬁrst 
consumed previous representations, participated in collective remembering, 
and then re-presented this memory in order to themselves become producers.    
  There are two fairly well-publicized representations concerning the 
Yuanmingyuan that I have encountered that contradict parts of what is 
commonly understood as the ofﬁcial narrative. Although the “ofﬁcial narrative” 
is, ﬁrst of all, composed of many narratives and the product of many 
individuals, and secondly, subject to changing ideologies and changing 
standards of approval by government authorities, for the sake of the argument, 
let us assume that there is enough thematic unity within the Yuanmingyuan 
narratives approved by government ofﬁcials between 1980 and 2010 for us to 
distinguish between this type of “ofﬁcial narrative” and ones that have not 
passed through the bureaucratic system of approval and do not share the 
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take the narrative discussed in Chapter 1 as an ofﬁcial narrative. The ﬁrst 
unofﬁcial text I want to name is the scholar, Yuan Weishiʼs, critique of Opium 
War history that was censored by government ofﬁcials after it was published. 
Yuanʼs text not only contradicts ofﬁcial ones by challenging their historical 
accuracy, but, more signiﬁcantly, directly undermines their ideological aims by 
identifying the mode of nationalism promoted in their narratives as one that 
uses notions of alterity to inspire emotion, and proposing an alternative mode 
of rational critique: 
It is obvious that we must love our country. But there are two ways to 
love our country. One way is to inﬂame nationalistic passions. 
Traditional Chinese culture has deeply ingrained ideas such as 
“Chinese and foreigners are different” and “if you are not my kind, 
then your loyalties must be opposite to mine.” Our thinking is still 
poisoned by them today. The latest edition is this: if there is a conﬂict 
between China and others, then China must be right; patriotism 
means opposing the other powers and the foreigners. In this selection 
and presentation of historical materials, we will only use those that 
favor China whether they are true or false. The other choice is this: 
we analyze everything rationally; if it is right, it is right and if it is 
wrong, it is wrong; calm, objective and wholly regard and handle all 
conﬂicts with the outside. (Yuan).
This text was censored by government ofﬁcials in order to prevent its being 
widely consumed and accepted into collective memory. 
  The other text I want to address is a play by Zhang Guangtian simply 
called “Yuanmingyuan” that was not censored. This is perhaps because, while 
thematically it contradicts ofﬁcial narratives by turning a critical eye on the 
Chinese people for their own destruction and exploitation of the 
Yuanmingyuan,  it retains the ofﬁcial images of the Qing court as corrupt and 
incompetent, and the foreigners as mean-spirited and barbaric. Therefore, 
despite a redistribution of blame, the play does not subvert the nationalistic 
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supporting the idea that the Yuanmingyuan is the national cultural heritage of 
all Chinese people and suggesting that the Chinese people must take self-
responsibility for their own crimes through the preservation of the 
Yuanmingyuan and protection of its cultural relics. The basic themes of ofﬁcial 
Yuanmingyuan narratives—that the foreign imperialists were barbaric 
aggressors, that the Qing court was corrupt and incompetent and that the 
Yuanmingyuan is a cultural product of the Chinese national collective, are all 
uncritically supported. 
  In an issue of China Heritage where Yuanmingyuan is the featured 
subject, one article holds up Zhangʼs play as an example of how “cultural 
producers are vague, ill informed or purposely evasive in their depiction of how 
the Anglo-French Expeditionary Force of 1860 came to destroy the garden 
palaces of the imperial court” (“On Stage”). The implication is that, despite the 
recent proliferation of references to the Yuanmingyuan in Chinese popular 
media, most representations are complicit with ofﬁcial narratives and actually 
serve to further promote rather than contradict their historical essentialism. 
The portrayal of the Yuanmingyuan in two other popular productions, the 
ﬁctional ﬁlm, “The Burning of the Yuanmingyuan” (Huoshao Yuanmingyuan Ր
എჵ໌䭉) that came out in 1983 when plans were still being laid for the 
Yuanmingyuan Ruins Park and the issue was particularly hot, and the 
imaginative tele-series, “Palace Painter Castiglione” (Gongting Huashi Lang 
Shining ܅ఊըഽ࿠ੈ䑳) that came out two decades later in 2003 both seem 
to support this assertion. The ﬁrst is a ﬁctionalized narrative about the young 
Nalashi, the future Dowager Empress Cixi, and the genesis of her rise to 
power, with the Yuanmingyuan as the primary setting and its burning as the 
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although there is a historically improbable scene where the Emperor Xianfeng 
enthusiastically shows Nalashi the Dashuifa fountain of the Western Palaces, 
which Barmé notes in his history had already fallen into disrepair by the end of 
Qianlongʼs reign (See Barmé, “Garden” 126-127 and Kraus note 32). The 
reason behind the foreignersʼ invasion of the Yuanmingyuan is not explained 
and the foreigners are portrayed as blood-thirsty barbarians. 
  “Palace Painter Castiglione” is a comic drama featuring the renowned 
Canadian sinophile, Da Shan େࢁ, as the historical Italian missionary 
Guiseppe Castiglione. The humor of the series centers around the bumbling 
mishaps and naivete of Lang Shining (Castiglione) and his (ﬁctional) forbidden 
love for the court princess. The Yuanmingyuan, as the Qing emperorsʼ primary 
residence from Kangxi on, is the setting for most of the scenes. Halfway 
through the series Lang Shining is charged with building the Western Palaces 
(Xiyanglou ੢༸࿖) by Emperor Qianlong. In one episode, in what could be 
read as an explicit espousal of the themes of Manchu corruption found in the 
ofﬁcial Yuanmingyuan narrative, an upright ofﬁcial criticizes the extravagance 
of the project and expresses a concern for the suffering populace. In another 
episode, Lang Shining is charged with building a temple for one of the 
emperorʼs concubines, Xiang Fei. Xiang Fei, “The Fragrant Concubine,” is an 
enduring ﬁgure in Yuanmingyuan mythology and her temple is among the 
ruins of the Western Palaces still extant today.
  The use of Yuanmingyuan tropes and the parroting of themes espoused 
in ofﬁcial narratives that is identiﬁable in the popular media between the 1980s 
and today might suggest that the state-promoted ofﬁcial narratives, even if not 
entirely successful in promoting strong national sentiment, were at least 
80successful in shaping the historical consciousness of the producers of popular 
media. Although, on the other hand, they might also suggest that the state 
censors have been particularly vigilant about barring representations of the 
Yuanmingyuan that overtly contradict ofﬁcial themes from entering into popular 
television. In any case, the thematic similarities between ofﬁcial and unofﬁcial 
representations of the Yuanmingyuan increase the likelihood that these 
themes are accepted by consumers.
  Daniel Lynch in his book, After the Propaganda State, argues that the 
post-Mao boom in commercialism and technology, which have caused an 
explosion in the dissemination of advertisements and information, has made it 
more difﬁcult for the authoritarian Chinese state to exercise tight control over 
representation and communication. As a result, information that contradicts or 
dilutes ofﬁcial narratives is more accessible, it is easier for people to express 
critical opinions uncensored and the populace is less likely to subscribe to 
state propaganda. Although, on the other hand, he argues that while the zeal 
of the populace towards state-promoted ideals characteristic of the Mao era 
has faded away in the post-Mao reform period, overshadowed by a more 
practical enthusiasm for material progress, historical beliefs and cultural 
values are still largely inﬂuenced by the state through media production and 
censorship. Yuan Weishiʼs essay on the historical inaccuracy of Chinese 
history textbooks is one example of how when unofﬁcial narratives explicitly 
criticize or contradict ofﬁcial narratives in a way deemed threatening to the 
status quo, they are promptly censored by state agents. While these state 
agents no longer can claim comprehensive domination over all that is 
produced and disseminated to the Chinese populace, censorship allows it to 
suppress select content that is deemed dangerous to the nationalist ideology 
81from which the state derives its authority. In other words, state ofﬁcials no 
longer produce collective memory; rather they are major shareholders in the 
mechanism of production, representation, and are able to take down the most 
threatening of their competitors to ensure that those afﬁliated with the state 
retain a heavy inﬂuence over collective memory.
  Perhaps the most inﬂuence state ofﬁcials exercise over collective 
memory is through school curriculum. School curriculums and textbooks have 
long been used as ideological tools for legitimizing social and political regimes, 
promoting national unity and pride, and instilling new generations with state-
approved knowledge and social values (Wang, Zheng). The national 
humiliation interpretation of Opium War history was ofﬁcially taught in schools 
beginning in 1915 (Cohen; Hevia, English). Although the curriculum has since 
undergone periodic editions, with the production of new textbooks to match the 
themes of each new era, the still overtly subjective and factually inaccurate 
Opium War history taught in the 21st century China has drawn criticism from 
both domestic and international scholars. In his article “Old Wounds, New 
Narratives: Joint History Textbook Writing and Peacebuilding in East Asia,” 
Zheng Wang describes how in 2005, Chinese, Japanese and South-Korean 
scholars joined forces to write a more balanced and inclusive textbook of 
modern East Asian history in an attempt to address the problem of historical 
distortion and national bias that has sparked international controversy and 
political tension in the last decade. Despite the broad support for and relative 
success of this effort, Zheng Wang concludes that government-approved, 
nation-centered accounts of history remain the norm in all three countriesʼ 
scholastic curricula and it will likely take decades for such reform efforts to 
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populace.  
  Today the Yuanmingyuan narrative is instilled in most Chinese citizens 
from a very young age; in fact, the patriotic education movement associated 
with the Yuanmingyuan was purposefully targeted towards grade school 
students. The Yuanmingyuan history on the ofﬁcial website cites that one tenth 
of the students visiting the Yuanmingyuan history exhibit set up in 1979 were 
elementary and middle school students. In 1983 the Beijing municipal 
government announced the Yuanmingyuan Ruins Parkʼs status as a site for 
the patriotic education of the youth. In the ensuing years, busloads of children 
were frequently shuttled to the site to learn about their countryʼs past 
humiliations. Haiyan Lee, in her article about the Yuanmingyuan as 
heterotopia, recalls her own ﬁeld trip to the Yuanmingyuan Ruins Park as a 
college freshman in 1986 and describes a group of high school students she 
encountered on her second visit nearly twenty years later (Lee).
  It is signiﬁcant to note that while Yuanmingyuan history is considered a 
quintessential part of the patriotic education of the Chinese youth, it is often 
presented differently in materials directed at foreigners. The dominant purpose 
of the Yuanmingyuan narrative when directed at a Chinese audience is not 
simply to convey what happened in history, but to inspire nationalism by 
promoting identiﬁcation with the proud and humiliating moments of national 
history. On the other hand, when the narrative is directed at a foreign audience 
who, as outsiders, could not possibly identify with the pride and humiliation of 
the Chinese nation, its purpose becomes to inform foreigners about a history 
of which they are presumably ignorant. Often, the Yuanmingyuan narrative is 
simply omitted from materials directed at foreigners.
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compiled by the Overseas Chinese Affairs Ofﬁce of the State Council in side-
by-side Chinese and English, and frequently distributed to foreign students 
studying abroad in China, has a chapter on “Ancient Chinese Architecture” that 
includes sections on “The Imperial Palace” and “Classical Gardens” and 
mentions both the Forbidden City and the [New] Summer Palace as well as a 
host of other more obscure venues, but not the Yuanmingyuan. There is also a 
chapter on Cultural Relics that includes coins and bells but makes no mention 
of the famous cultural relics from the Yuanmingyuan. This omission is 
signiﬁcant considering Yuanmingyuanʼs prominent status within China as the 
archetypal Chinese garden and the culmination of thousands of years of 
Chinese cultural knowledge. If the motive of the book is to promote the 
greatness of Chinese culture to an ill-informed Western audience, why was the 
Yuanmingyuan excluded? Perhaps since the only visible elements of the 
Yuanmingyuanʼs former glory that remain are Western-style ruins, the park is 
not deemed an ideal object of display to convey the idea of Chinese cultural 
greatness, or perhaps it was feared that the nationalistic Yuanmingyuan 
narrative would alienate a Western audience or even be construed as 
xenophobic.
  Whatever the reason for this omission in the book on culture, its sister 
volume, Common Knowledge about Chinese History, contains a brief account 
of the Yuanmingyuanʼs burning in a separate box to the side of the main text. 
The English text written underneath the Chinese reads:
Situated in the northwestern suburb of Beijing, the Yuanmingyuan 
Garden (the Old Summer Palace) was a resort of the Qing emperors 
during the height of summer. It was a world renowned imperial 
garden. In October 1860, during the Second Opium War, British and 
French allied forces captured Beijing. They plundered the 
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take away. In order to cover their deeds, they burned the garden to 
the ground. Three days and nights, ﬁre and smoke could be seen in 
northwest Beijing. (189).
This text is ostensibly a direct translation of the Chinese text above it. While I 
am certainly not advocating the idea that a single authentic translation of the 
Chinese text exists, I must point out that factually the English translation 
communicates two ideas that the Chinese text does not: 1. The assertion that 
the Yuanmingyuan was “a resort of the Qing emperors during the height of 
summer.” The Chinese says that the Yuanmingyuan is “another palace of the 
Qing emperors” (Qingchao huangdi de biegong ਗ਼ேߖఇత䫲܅) but has no 
mention of summer. The English seems to be trying to justify the common 
English-language appellation “Old Summer Palace,” which has no equivalent 
in Chinese and, as Wong Young-tsu notes in his introduction, is actually quite 
misleading since the emperors, starting with Kangxi, in fact occupied the 
Yuanmingyuan as a primary residence. 2. The assertion that “ﬁre and smoke 
could be seen in northwest Beijing.” The Chinese text says that “smoke clouds 
enveloped the entire city of Beijing” (yanyun longzhaole zhengge Beijingcheng 
ᖸӠ੆᠚ྃ੔࿽๺ژ৓). The English text seems to be trying to de-hyperbolize 
the Chinese. Similarly, the way in which words are chosen or omitted from 
translation in the English suggests a watering-down of highly connotative 
rhetoric. “They plundered the gardenʼs treasures clean” (jiang yuannei 
zhenbao qiangjie yi kong ক䭉಺௝ๅఽ߷Ұۭ) becomes simply “they 
plundered the Yuanmingyuan Garden.”   “Precious cultural artifacts” (zhengui 
wenwu ௝݌จ෺) becomes simply “treasures,” and the soldiersʼ 
“crimes” (zuixing ࡑߦ) become “deeds.” I am not arguing that the textbookʼs 
English translation is wrong, but, rather, that the translator is aware of the 
85change in audience and his connotative choices accordingly reﬂect a desire to 
soften the condemnatory impact of the Chinese words.
  Another example of this phenomenon can be found in the ofﬁcial 
Yuanmingyuan websiteʼs English translation of the history of the Western 
Palaces (this is not the same as the much longer introduction to 
Yuanmingyuan history detailed in section 1, which is not translated). If we 
contrast the English translation given of the second to last paragraph with my 
own attempt at a detail-oriented translation, we have:
Parts of these stone buildings survived the ﬁre of 1860, and still stand 
today as a reminder of the national tragedy.
As opposed to:
When Yuanmingyuan was plundered in 1860, many of these Western-
style palaces survived because they were built mainly of stone. After a 
century of hardship, they are still standing, warning the people of the 
present not to forget the blood and tears of history.
My intention, again, is not to suggest that the website translation is wrong and 
mine correct, but to point out that in the former the English words have been 
pared down to suit the audience addressed and thus do not have the same 
rhetorical effect as the Chinese. The assertion in the Chinese that the ruins 
are “warning the people of the present not to forget the blood and tears of 
history” (jingshi shiren wuwang xueleishi ܯࣔੈਓ໪๨݂ᔢ࢙) exposes a 
subjective narrator who is actually addressing the Chinese people and 
prescribing the way in which the ruins must be read—as something 
unforgettably painful, their own blood and tears. These same words could not 
properly be addressed to a non-Chinese audience without alienating it 
because contextually the blood and tears would be someone elseʼs; the 
emotional empathy needed to feel the urgency of the warning to not forget 
would not exist. This is why the English translation is pedagogically aloof; it 
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Chinese as a “reminder of national tragedy.”  
  My examination of references to the Yuanmingyuan in China and 
Beijing travel guides yielded similar ﬁndings about the difference between 
those written in Chinese and those written in English. While each of the ten 
China travel guides that I examined that were written in Chinese for a Chinese 
audience included the Yuanmingyuan, often as a must-see Beijing site, the 
one English-language China travel guide that I found in Chinese bookstores 
did not include the Yuanmingyuan, and of the three English-language Beijing 
travel guides I examined, only two of them included the Yuanmingyuan. The 
description of the Yuanmingyuan in each of these was brief and its tone was 
objective.
  In the Yuanmingyuan Park itself and on the parkʼs website very few 
texts are translated. Everything on the website, including its historical account 
of the Yuanmingyuan (described in section 1), historical timeline, and all of its 
image captions, are exclusively in Chinese. The only exceptions to this are the 
introductions to each of the parkʼs main tourist sights whose translations are 
taken directly from a tourist brochure that can be purchased at the park. In the 
Yuanmingyuan museum found within the Western Ruins section of the park, 
all information except a brief introduction of Yuanmingyuan history in English 
and a reproduction of Victor Hugoʼs letter to his friend in French is exclusively 
in Chinese. Within the Western Palaces section of the park, brief tablets in 
front of the ruins of each identiﬁable building are accompanied by English 
translations, but a side display about cultural artifacts that have been lost 
abroad (liushi haiwai ྲྀࣦւ֎) is exclusively in Chinese. 
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exhibition displays such as those in the Twelve Zodiac Animal Head Exhibition 
are not. At the gates of the Yuanmingyuan, visitors can hire a tour guide to 
personally explain Yuanmingyuanʼs history or rent an audio headset for a 
lower price, but both of these tools are exclusively in Chinese and thus 
completely inaccessible to non-Chinese speakers (in contrast to the [New] 
Summer Palace and Forbidden City, which both offer English-language tour 
guides and audio headsets available in a variety of languages). In general, 
what all this amounts to is a visually-oriented experience for the non-Chinese 
speaker that does not convey a strong sense of what the history of the 
Yuanmingyuan was, why it was important or how different sections of the park 
are related. Where the park aims to inculcate Chinese citizens with a sense of 
national responsibility, it keeps non-Chinese largely in the dark through 
linguistic exclusion. Richard Kraus picks up on this when he remarks “[the 
parkʼs function as a symbol of victimhood] is often missed by non-Chinese: a 
group of American university students who visited the Yuanming Yuan in 1987 
believed the ruins to be the result of the Cultural Revolutionʼs infamous Red 
Guard vandalism” (198). Indeed, even scholars outside of China seem to be 
confused about the Yuanmingyuan. Young-Tsu Wong, in the introduction to his 
2003 book-length study of the Yuanmingyuan, lists several ill-informed 
references to the Yuanmingyuan by Western scholars and criticizes the few 
existing English-language studies on the topic as lacking rigorous scholarship. 
(2). The Yuanmingyuan has certainly received more international attention in 
the years since the publication of Wongʼs book, both in academic scholarship 
and popular media, though, much of this is in connection with the 
Yuanmingyuan zodiacs (discussed in section 5).
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Park is due more to an unwillingness to invest the funds and resources 
necessary to translate the park experience for foreign tourists than deliberate 
politically-motivated exclusion. Since Yuanmingyuan is a much less popular 
tourist spot for foreigners than sites like the Forbidden City and [New] Summer 
Palace, such an investment might not prove economically expedient. At the 
same time, Yuanmingyuanʼs weaker appeal to foreign tourists can be 
explained in part by the fact that that from the parkʼs inception in the 1980s it 
was not actively targeted at foreign audiences. 
  The critique of some Western scholars that the Yuanmingyuanʼs 
historical narrative promotes xenophobia stems from its overt use of alterity to 
promote national unity. The Yuanmingyuan history promoted in the Ruins 
Parkʼs museum is a shining example of what Zheng Wang identiﬁes as a 
universal tool of nation-states: “simplistic narratives that ﬂatter their own group 
and promote group unity by emphasizing sharp divergences between 
themselves and other groups” (104). In this narrative, the British and French 
soldiers who burnt down the Yuanmingyuan are dehumanized as barbaric 
aggressors in order to form a contrast with the Chinese people as hapless 
victims. This binary is asymmetrically presented through the rhetoric of the 
narrative so that the audience identiﬁes with the victims. The narrative is thus 
not meant for reception by a non-Chinese audience since such an audience, 
unable to identify with the Chinese victims, would naturally read in the rhetoric 
of the narrative a critique of itself as foreign other. This theory suggests that 
the same representational strategies that encouraged the entry of the 
Yuanmingyuan into Chinese collective consciousness inhibited it from being 
marketable to a foreign audience. On the other hand, this does not indicate 
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visitors. 
  The ﬁrst time I visited the Yuanmingyuan was in the summer of 2008. 
Completely unaware of the parkʼs historical signiﬁcance at the time, I was 
invited to the park by a close local friend of mine and her parents to 
accompany them on an excursion they made every summer. Although our 
primary objective was to enjoy the gorgeous summer scenery, and this is what 
we did with the majority of our time there, for my beneﬁt, we also paid the 
extra ticket price to venture into the area that contained the ruins of the 
Western Palaces. I was astonished when I saw the apparently European-style 
ruins upon which numerous Chinese were happily clambering. My friend 
prefaced her explanation of the site by saying that usually her family would not 
bring foreigners to the park, but because of my half-Chinese heritage, I too 
should know about the shameful national history. Needless to say, this left a 
deep impression on me. As I became more familiar with the Yuanmingyuan, I 
realized that what she had done was include me as one of the victims of 
Yuanmingyuanʼs tragic history by virtue of my Chinese bloodline and impress 
upon me the inculcated responsibility that was impressed upon her since 
youth: to remember. And yet, this was only the beginning of our trip; after a 
brief survey of the ruins, we headed back towards the beautiful lake area to 
stroll and take pictures.  
  It seems to me that the ofﬁcial explanation that the Yuanmingyuan ruins 
are metonymy for the humiliations China suffered during the Opium War era is 
imprinted on the minds of the consuming populace as a sort of national 
doctrine, comparable to how the assertion in Christian doctrine that “the cross 
symbolizes Jesusʼ death for our sins” is imprinted upon the minds of 
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symbolic signiﬁcance has passed the stage of being interpretable; “national 
humiliation” is a set referent for the signiﬁer “Yuanmingyuan.” And yet, the 
solidiﬁcation of this referent does not preclude other referents, just as the 
cross can have other connotations as well. 
  What is occurring with the collective memory of the Yuanmingyuan 
seems somewhat analogous to what Cohen argues about the national 
humiliation narrative in the 1920s and 30s: it was not literally forgotten, but 
became trite through repetition. If we accept the premise that historical 
forgetting is the result of a dampening emotional appeal to a given signiﬁer, 
then remembering is encouraged by just the opposite—a linkage of a given 
signiﬁer with a strong emotional stimulus. Sakai names this emotional stimulus 
“sentimentality” and posits it as the prerequisite for promoting the belief of 
national unity: “In order for an event that occurs in one part of the national 
community to be felt as if it belonged to the whole community, a mechanism 
for diffusing sentimentality must exist here” (17). Sakai goes further to say, 
“ʻSentimentality is analogous to the types of emotion one experiences when, 
on the basis of formalities rooted in preconceived ideas, one forms a 
stereotype of another and then respects, scorns or fears him or her. Diffusion 
of these emotions is rooted in a communityʼs possession of a common 
etiquette or patterns of behavior” (17). Among the devices Sakai identiﬁes that 
diffuse sentimentality among a national community are, “the discourse of 
national culture” and “national history” (16). Both of these discourses can be 
thought of as discursive collective memories, and I want to propose that, at the 
most basic level, the device for promoting national sentimentality, or 
nationalism, is representation.
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sentimentality demanded by the etiquette embedded within her memory of the 
Yuanmingyuan that she received through representations. Because the 
representations she received promote the assumption that the collective who 
ought to share these sentiments is “the Chinese people” as an all-
encompassing ethnic group, my friend unconsciously assumed that I too, as 
part of that ethnic group by blood, ought to be bound by the same code of 
etiquette and share the same feelings of sentimentality.  And yet, it seems that 
the obligation of sentimentality, to feel a certain way in a given circumstance, 
does not always translate into real emotion. We might speculate that the 
“indifference and passivity...in the mood of the Chinese populace” that Cohen 
identiﬁes as characteristic of the memory of national humiliation between 1915 
and the mid-1930s was a case when the etiquette that demanded 
sentimentality continued to exist but did not result in genuine emotion. The 
kind of complete forgetting, then, that Cohen attributes to the 1970s when the 
new generation was chronologically distant from the national humiliations, 
would be when even the etiquette that obligates sentimentality is not present 
or acknowledged. 
  But what explains the transition between proper sentimentality that 
manifests genuine emotion and obligatory sentimentality that manifests only 
performance? Cohen identiﬁes two phenomena that accompanied the popular 
indifference of 1915 to the 1930s: 1. a manipulation of the content and import 
of what was to be remembered during yearly celebrations and, 2. a 
displacement of the emotion associated with national humiliation onto other 
political issues or even commercial products (156). This suggests that the 
discourse of national humiliation, on the one hand, lost its original integrity that 
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singular monumentality as it was trivialized by its association with a variety of 
other agendas. Unclear about what precisely national humiliation was 
supposed to mean any longer and without a sense that it was particularly 
important, people were no longer moved by its invocation, but because 
etiquette demanded that national humiliation “not be forgotten,” they continued 
the performance of commemoration. The ofﬁcial lessons were repeated as 
truisms but they had lost their underlying signiﬁcance. 
  A similar obfuscation of meaning seems to have occurred in the 
discourse of the Yuanmingyuan between the 1980s, when the Ruins Park was 
ﬁrst being built, and the present, which has seen numerous architectural and 
ideological renovations. As discussed in the previous section, the narrative of 
Yuanmingyuan history that was presented in the 1980s and 90s drew upon the 
previous idea of the ruined Yuanmingyuan as a symbol of national humiliation, 
but added to this narrative a new phase of Yuanmingyuan history in which the 
renovation of the Yuanmingyuan ruins and opening of the Yuanmingyuan Park 
became a symbol of China having left behind the era of humiliation and 
emerged as a powerful modern nation. This latter idea seems somewhat 
inconsistent with the old exhortation inscribed on a wall that was dedicated to 
the Yuanmingyuan Ruins Park in 1997: “never forget the national 
humiliations” (wuwang guochi ໪๨ࠃᡄ). The one turns towards the bright 
future where China is one among the powerful nations, while the other seems 
stuck in the dark past when China was the victim of the foreign powers. Is the 
average Chinese visitor to Yuanmingyuan supposed to mourn the past or 
embrace the future, to resent the foreigners or to take his place among them, 
or is possible to do both simultaneously? 
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the Ruins Park. The last sentence of the brief preface, the only text translated 
into English in the museum reads: “[The Yuanmingyuanʼs] sufferings reﬂect 
from an angle the humiliation imposed on the Chinese nation by the imperialist 
powers since the Opium War and the garden itself is an epitome of the fate of 
the Chinese nation in modern history.” What this fate is supposed to be 
becomes clear in the last phase of the exhibit, which starts with a plaque 
entitled “the Yuanmingyuanʼs new life,” proceeds through the Yuanmingyuan 
Ruins Parkʼs construction, reopening and renovations, and ends with a plaque 
entitled “a window opened to the outside” that features pictures of important 
Chinese and foreign personages posing happily together at the 
Yuanmingyuan. If this contradiction is part of the reason for popular apathy, it 
never consciously occurs to most Chinese visitors, who, once they have taken 
the expected snapshot in front of the iconic Dashuifa fountain, might sweep 
through the easily-overlooked and unimpressive museum exhibits, then walk 
along the picturesque Fuhai lake back to the parkʼs main entrance. The 
question then is, was popular sentimentality towards the Yuanmingyuan from 
the 1980s ever anything but performance? If the sight of the ruins does not 
inspire genuine nationalist sentiment, then what does?
  In the 1980s when the Yuanmingyuan was being constructed, the 
discourse of the Yuanmingyuan was associated with the increasingly popular 
international discourse of cultural heritage. This association grew into a more 
speciﬁc preoccupation with the repatriation of Yuanmingyuan loot in the 21st 
century, when the existing collective memory of the Yuanmingyuan, with its 
potential for inspiring nationalistic passion, was re-framed to ﬁt this new 
context through the potent images of the twelve zodiac animal heads from the 
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and British soldiers in 1860. This displacement of emotion associated with the 
Yuanmingyuan to a new subject, while promoting nationalism on the new front, 
may have contributed to the pragmatism with which many people seem to 
regard the Yuanmingyuan ruins today.
955. Recycling the Memory of Yuanmingyuan: Cultural Heritage, Zodiacs 
and Repatriation
  In this section, I will illustrate how the collective memory of the 
Yuanmingyuan was recycled in the 21st century as it became increasingly 
entangled with the discourse of national cultural heritage, in simple terms, the 
idea that historical artwork, architecture and other objects are representative of 
both national and universal or human culture. Cultural heritage is a discourse 
with its own complex history, both in a global context and within the speciﬁc 
context of China. Therefore, while it is necessary for me to locate the turn in 
the Yuanmingyuan discourse towards repatriation of Yuanmingyuan loot that 
had been stolen almost a century and a half before in a historical context, 
broader issues of cultural heritage are not my focus, nor is it my aim to use the 
example of Yuanmingyuan to take a position in the ethical debate over 
repatriation of cultural heritage items currently raging. Rather, I use the debate 
in the context of Yuanmingyuan as a case study, and concern myself with it 
only insofar as it helps me to explain the phenomenon of Yuanmingyuanʼs 
versatility and evocativeness in terms of collective memory. That said, this 
undertaking requires an explanation of both the global trends of national 
heritage leading up to the 21st century and their domestic manifestations in 
China. Magnus Fiskesjö introduces these effectively at the beginning of his 
article about 21st century repatriation issues in China, “The Politics of Cultural 
Heritage”: 
China is not a country but an idea, which was reformulated in the 
twentieth century to ﬁt with the hegemonic world nation-state system. 
This involved a reformulation not only of the idea of the Chinese 
empire, but also of the remains of the past—including artifacts that 
once served as the mystiﬁed insignia of power of mighty rulers, or as 
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playthings of the wealthy; and also objects previously unknown 
unearthed by modern archaeology, that is, artifacts left by people 
living in “China” long before China became China. Similar to what has 
happened in other “countries,” these objects have been recast as 
“national cultural heritage,” and are believed to carry the essence of a 
Chineseness reaching back “5000 years”—a claim inseparable from 
the new contemporary global politics of representation in the arena of 
competing nation-states (where, one might say, modern China claims 
participation based on “civilizational antiquity” and “unbroken 
continuity”). (228).
Just like the construction of the Yuanmingyuan Park in the 1980s, the call for 
repatriation of Yuanmingyuan loot as objects of cultural heritage in the 1990s 
can be broadly attributed to the project of Chinese nationalism. At the same 
time, as Fiskesjö suggests in his article, the repatriation initiative has broader 
historical and political ramiﬁcations that can be traced through the 20th 
century. 
  The earliest legislation concerning the protection of cultural heritage in 
China was the ordinance, “Measures for the Protection of Ancient Sites,” 
passed by the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the declining Qing dynasty in 1909, 
probably in response to the exploitation of the Mogao Grottoes in Dunhuang 
by foreigners in 1907. (Lai 82). In 1931, after the Nationalist Party had come to 
power, additional legislation was passed to protect ancient artifacts, signaling 
the beginning of a modern conservation effort spearheaded by Liang Sicheng, 
the son of reformer Liang Qichao (Murphy 47, Lai 82). In the 1950s, after the 
chaos of World War II and the establishment in 1945 of the United Nations 
Educational, Scientiﬁc, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) as a mediator of 
cultural heritage disputes on the international front; and the establishment of 
the Peopleʼs Republic of China (PRC) headed by the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) in 1949 on the domestic front; the new Chinese state began to 
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෺) magazine began publication in 1950 and announced a directive by the 
Government Affairs Bureau calling for the protection of cultural relics and 
architecture (“Zhengwuyuan”). The terms wenwu จ෺, “cultural relic,” and 
guobao ࠃๅ,“national treasure,” seem to have been used frequently in mass 
publications around this time (this insight is based on database searches). In 
1950, provisions regarding the excavation and export of art and archeological 
items were issued. Conservation efforts, however, were complicated by 
conﬂicting construction efforts and debates about what to preserve and how to 
preserve it. (Lai 86). In 1961 a circular was passed listing 180 speciﬁc cultural 
relics, sites and monuments to be protected (Lai 87, Murphy 183-184). 
  The new emphasis on the protection of cultural artifacts may seem at 
odds with the ensuing Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), in which huge 
amounts of material culture were systematically destroyed by the populace at 
the direction of Chairman Mao Zedong in an attempt to obliterate the old and 
outdated remnants of the former feudal society. David Murphy, in his book 
about Chinese legislation concerning items of cultural heritage, Plunder and 
Preservation, brieﬂy addresses this problem by framing the Cultural Revolution 
in terms of a political factional struggle and drastic ideological turn with self-
evident contradictions even in its own time: 
It may well be argued that the destruction wrought by the Cultural 
Revolution was never intended as an attack on Chinese history or 
culture per se, but rather was the extreme result of political necessity. 
Maoʼs apparent attack on Chinese history was the ultimate 
contradiction. Up until the Cultural Revolution, he had always used 
history to accommodate the goal of the revolution: the Communists 
promoted and exploited nationalism by exhorting the people to 
cherish their cultural tradition...However, once Mao feared that his 
enemies were using history to wage a contemporary ﬁght against him, 
he immediately ascribed to them the perceived worst features of 
Chinese history--imperialism and feudalism. (50)
98Despite the Mao-instigated mass cultural destruction, some Party leaders 
were still concerned with cultural protection. In 1967, when the Cultural 
Revolution was just beginning, the State Council Opinion Concerning the 
Protection of Cultural Relics and Books, which “though couched in the 
mandatory revolutionary slogans, was actually aimed at saving sites” (Murphy 
49) was passed. Other legislation aimed at the protection of cultural artifacts 
was passed in the latter years of the Cultural Revolution. 
  The turn from destroying traditional culture to again cherishing it seems 
to have been as drastic as the ideological reversal of the Cultural Revolution 
had been. In the 1970s, perhaps inﬂuenced by the UNESCO Convention 
Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage of 1972 
whose aim was to protect cultural sites of global import, the discourse of 
cultural heritage in China was reframed from its previous more narrowly anti-
imperialist focus to a focus on national patrimony or “cultural 
nationalism” (Murphy 3-4). Beginning in the 1970s, there was an increased 
popular consciousness about cultural heritage issues and a proliferation of 
legislation regarding cultural property, which grew to include artifacts, books, 
architecture, art and natural sites. The 1982 “Law of the People's Republic of 
China on Protection of Cultural Relics” put forth “not changing the original 
condition” as the primary principle from which to approach conservation 
efforts, although debates about how and to what extent sites should be 
preserved in tempo with simultaneous construction efforts continued. (Lai 87). 
Beginning in the 1980s, national efforts at cultural preservation were formally 
identiﬁed with international aims of preserving world culture. The UNESCO 
Convention of 1972 provided for an ofﬁcial list of world heritage sites whose 
protection UNESCO would support. The government of each participating 
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according to criteria laid down by the convention. China ratiﬁed the convention 
on December 12, 1985 and immediately began to submit sites for approval. To 
date in 2010, 38 sites have been approved and more than 50 additional sites 
have been submitted and are on the tentative list for approval. (“World”). 
  The 1980s construction of the Yuanmingyuan Ruins Park was, from the 
start, aimed at protecting the ruins as part of cultural heritage. This is explicitly 
stated in the declaration signed by government ofﬁcials in 1980 calling for the 
parkʼs construction (Yuanmingyuan: Lishi 466-473). Considering this fact, it is 
notable that Yuanmingyuan was not submitted to the UNESCO list of world 
cultural sites, although whether or not it should be submitted and under what 
principle of protection, were the subjects of a heated debate in 2008 that was 
strongly connected to the debate beginning in the 1980s about how to 
preserve the ruins and whether or not the Yuanmingyuan should be 
completely rebuilt to resemble the ﬂourishing mid-18th century imperial garden 
(Chen, Yongjie). In this sense, the Yuanmingyuan preservation debate of the 
1980s was the culmination of the “ferment of competing values” about the 
protection of cultural heritage. (Lai 88).
  As established in section 3, the idea that the looting and destruction of 
Yuanmingyuan in 1860 and 1900 was a national humiliation has existed since 
the early 20th century. In some cases, Yuanmingyuan loot that had been taken 
by foreign imperialists and not the Yuanmingyuan site itself was presented as 
the catalyst for feelings of national humiliation, as when, in the early 1900s 
Liang Qichao and Kang Youwei wrote about the shame they felt at viewing 
Yuanmingyuan loot abroad. (Hevia, “Lootʼs Fate” 336 and English 334). The 
theme of Yuanmingyuan loot that has been lost abroad (liushi haiwai ྲྀࣦւ
100֎) being a part of national humiliation is represented in the Yuanmingyuan 
Park museum displays, although it is difﬁcult to determine whether this was 
the case since the museumʼs opening in 1979 or one of the periodic updates 
contributed since then. In one of the display panels, the images of two of the 
twelve zodiac heads that were originally part of the Haiyantang fountain but 
looted in 1860, are shown and the location of each of the heads is listed in a 
block of text in the center. The locations listed on the display are now 
outdated, indicating that it has not been updated at least since the year 2000. 
  The 1997 return of Hong Kong from British hands to Chinese 
jurisdiction was considered a major turn in the national humiliation narrative, 
signifying the end of the “century of humiliation” (bainian guochi ඦ೥ࠃᡄ). 
Parallels are often drawn between Hong Kong, which was ceded to England in 
the 1942 Treaty of Nanking at the end of the First Opium War (1839-1842) and 
Yuanmingyuan loot that was taken by English and French soldiers in 1860 
shortly before the conclusion of the Second Opium War (1856-1860), as parts 
of Chinese heritage that were stolen by imperialists and whose retrieval is part 
of Chinaʼs mission of redemption from that shameful period of history. After the 
repatriation of Hong Kong in 1997, a lantern festival was held in the 
Yuanmingyuan in celebration and a “never forget the national 
humiliation” (wuwang guochi ໪๨ࠃᡄ) wall was erected, featuring the text of 
the “unequal treaties” from the Opium Wars and detailing a history of 
imperialism in China. Having tasted the triumph of Hong Kongʼs return, and 
the upsurge in popular nationalism it provoked, government ofﬁcials began to 
pursue the repatriation of cultural relics looted from China with increasing 
vigor.
101  The Yuanmingyuan zodiacs were bronze statues with humanoid bodies 
and heads designed to resemble the twelve animals of the Chinese zodiac. 
They were originally positioned six to each side around the head of a circular 
fountain, the Haiyantang, which kept time by spouting water from a different 
head every two hours. The fountain was designed by the Italian painter and 
architect Guiseppe Castiglione under the employ of Emperor Qianlong as part 
of the Yuanmingyuanʼs Western Palaces. The heads were removed from their 
positions on the fountains and taken by French and British soldiers during the 
Yuanmingyuanʼs looting in 1860. 
  Often in narratives describing the zodiacs as objects of Chinese cultural 
heritage, a historical description ends with the 1860 looting, after which the 
account jumps to recent events of the 21st century. However, a scrutiny of the 
history of Yuanmingyuan loot from 1860 to the present reveals that objects 
looted from the Yuanmingyuan took on different meanings as different 
conceptions of value emerged. Viewing Yuanmingyuan loot as objects of 
Chinese cultural heritage is a relatively recent phenomenon reﬂecting a 
deliberately imposed value scheme. The historical trajectory of the value of 
Yuanmingyuan loot intersects with the discourse of cultural heritage in China 
around the late 1970s and early 1980s when the Yuanmingyuan Park and 
ofﬁcial narratives to accompany it were being constructed. In other words, 
Yuanmingyuan loot was seen as part of Chinese national humiliation since the 
early 1900s, but did not take on a speciﬁc signiﬁcance as relics of cultural 
heritage that must be repatriated until the 1970s.
  In 1860, after the English and French soldiersʼ disordered looting of the 
garden, the English commanders, in an astute attempt to restore order and 
authority, conﬁscated all of the items and held an auction just outside the 
102Yuanmingyuan, in which each soldier could bid freely for the items he desired. 
Money from the auctions was then divided among the soldiers according to 
rank.  Afterwards these items made their way back to Europe, where the best 
were given to the English queen Victoria for her personal collection. The rest 
circulated among the international art market and found their way into private 
art collections and public exhibitions. Objects illegally looted from the 
Yuanmingyuan by Chinese between 1860 and the early 20th century often 
were sold to wealthy foreigners and circulated through the same channels. 
Hevia observes that even in this period, objects looted from the Yuanmingyuan 
had various meanings:
They could signify the orderly reconstitution of the British army and 
the disorderly conduct of the French, the humiliation of the emperor of 
China, the expanded sovereignty of the British and French monarchs, 
the situation of things Chinese in a global discourse on the curiosities 
of non-European peoples, and, as commodities, the common sense 
of capitalist market exchange. These meanings adhered to the 
objects once they left China and began to circulate in an alien 
environment on the other side of the Eurasian land mass. (Hevia, 
Plunder 133-134).
  Auctions that included loot from the Yuanmingyuan among other 
objects were frequent from 1860 on, particularly in Europe and the United 
States where demand for such objects was high. At ﬁrst the objects were sold 
as “curiosities”—a somewhat condescending term used by Europeans to 
describe strange or exotic objects, including those taken from foreign lands—
but, from around 1915 onwards, when the loot began to be labeled more 
rigorously according to a classiﬁcation system developed by Stephen Bushell, 
items were increasingly endowed with value as legitimate international art. The 
art market became more globalized as the 20th century progressed and 
auctions of Chinese Dynastic art were held in China beginning in the 
mid-1990s, where such items held the status of high art according to 
103European standards. (For details about Yuanmingyuan loot and auctions see 
Hevia, “Lootʼs” and “Plunder;” and Kraus, “When”).
  In the last decade, the Yuanmingyuan zodiac heads have captured the 
attention of the international media and provoked patriotic outbursts in China 
on account of a series of controversial auctions. In 2000, sellers Christies and 
Sotheby held a pair of art auctions that included among their merchandise 
three bronze zodiac heads from the Yuanmingyuan: the tiger, monkey and ox. 
Other auctions of zodiac heads had taken place in New York and London in 
1986 and 1989, but had gone largely unnoticed by the Chinese media. 
According to one Chinese article written in 2000, Taiwanese businessman, 
Cha Chenyang, had purchased the monkey head in 1986 and the ox, horse 
and lionʼs heads in 1989, ostensibly out of patriotic sentiment. He initially 
refused to sell these objects to non-Chinese foreigners (laowai ࿝֎), but 
eventually caved to business pressure and ended up selling them off, after 
which they changed hands several times before three of them ended up on 
the auction market in Hong Kong in 2000 (Xi). Much of the controversy of the 
2000 auctions arose from the fact that they were held in Hong Kong, the only 
recently repatriated Chinese territory whose return had been widely celebrated 
in mainland China as an end to the century of imperialist humiliations inﬂicted 
upon the Chinese nation. Chinese government ofﬁcials issued a statement 
urging that the auction be stopped, claiming that it was “insulting and deeply 
painful to the Chinese people to have these things sold before their 
eyes” (Kraus 199). Wide media coverage of this in China led to an outpour of 
popular indignation both online and in the Chinese press. The reaction was so 
strong that the foreign media also covered the story. The auction continued 
despite these complaints and, in the end, the Poly Group, a nationalist Beijing 
104company with close ties to the Peopleʼs Liberation Army, under the conviction 
that the heads must be reclaimed for China at all costs, purchased them for a 
hefty sum of 4 million US dollars.  
  Richard Kraus in his article, “When legitimacy resides in beautiful 
objects,” describes the Chinese military-based Poly Groupʼs reclamation of 
objects that were originally looted by British soldiers as an act that served to 
legitimize the current Chinese government and its army as heroes reclaiming 
the cultural treasures lost by the corrupt and feeble Qing regime. Certainly, 
there is this element behind the drive for repatriation. Cultural objects have 
long held ties to political legitimacy both universally and in China speciﬁcally, 
especially after the division of national artifacts between Taiwanʼs National 
Palace Museum in Taipei and the Peopleʼs Republic of Chinaʼs Palace 
Museum in Beijing (Elliott; “Heritage”).
  The campaign to repatriate the zodiac heads continued after the 
auctions of 2000. In 2002 the China Cultural Relics Recovery Fund was 
established (Cuno 101). In 2003 Macau businessman, Stanley Ho, purchased 
the pig head for 770 thousand US dollars, and in 2007 he purchased the horse 
head for the much-inﬂated price of 8.9 million US dollars, donating both to the 
Poly Museum in Beijing (Zhao). There was a more recent clamor in 2009 over 
the auction of two more Zodiac heads, those of the rat and rabbit, by a French 
collector, Pierre Berge. The Chinese government protested that the rat and 
rabbit, as looted goods, should be returned to China and that the auction 
should be cancelled. Berge issued a highly politicized counter-statement 
sarcastically offering the two heads in exchange for the application of human 
rights in China and Tibetan freedom. The Chinese media was ﬂooded with 
reactive statements, one article declared: “To use ʻhuman rightsʼ to abduct 
105cultural relics is both ridiculous and lamentable” (Zheng, Suchun). To 
complicate matters further, when the sale did take place from February 23-25, 
the bronzes were awarded to wealthy Chinese bidder Cai Mingchao, who 
subsequently defaulted on his payment of $40 million US dollars. Originally, 
Cai presented this as a bold act of patriotism to prevent the sale of Chinaʼs 
cultural heritage and was praised in the Chinese media as a national hero 
(McCabe). However, later Cai stated in an interview that he had defaulted out 
of fear that the statues would not be allowed to enter China and was 
condemned in the media for inﬂating the price of the zodiacs, making it more 
difﬁcult for China to complete its mission of repatriating all of the zodiac heads 
(“Cai”).
  Critics have pointed out that, as art that is actually quite mediocre, the 
heads are not worth nearly $40 million dollars and that the Cai episode is 
indicates the patriotic fervor to reclaim zodiac heads has perhaps gone too far. 
The question of why repatriation efforts have focused on bronze animal heads 
originally sculpted by an Italian missionary that have little resemblance to 
traditional Chinese art, in particular, as opposed to other less ambiguous 
objects of Chinese cultural heritage also emerges. The 2000 Hong Kong 
auctions that began the zodiac repatriation initiative, in fact, also included a 
large hexagonal vase that had been looted from the Yuanmingyuan, but this 
attracted much less attention than the zodiac heads. (Kraus 199). It would 
seem that the undue attention placed on the zodiacs is largely due to their 
convenient representational qualities as lost pieces of the still-extant and 
iconic ruins of the Western Palaces. 
   Because the Western Palaces were the predominant surviving feature 
of the Yuanmingyuan and the Haiyantang fountain on which the zodiac statues 
106once rested was already well-known by Chinese in 2000, it was easy to 
transfer the nationalistic connotations that had been meticulously infused into 
the ruins through representation over the past two decades metonymically to 
the zodiacs. Readily marketable images of the zodiac bronzes juxtaposed with 
the widely recognized image of the ruined Haiyantang fountain, and historical 
explanations linking them to the national humiliations already associated with 
the Yuanmingyuan ﬂooded the Chinese media and quickly caught the attention 
of the foreign press. By means of effective propaganda, the Western-style, 
artistically unremarkable bronze statues became symbols of Chinese cultural 
heritage whose sale was no longer merely a diversion for connoisseurs of 
historical artwork, but held political stakes for the entire Chinese nation. 
  The reason why the 2000 auction as opposed to the previous auction of 
Yuanmingyuan zodiacs a decade before was so emotionally provoking to 
Chinese was that it occurred at a time when the discourses of 
Yuanmingyuanʼs looting, national humiliation and cultural heritage had all 
become active in popular consciousness, and at a site where these discourses 
could be conveniently activated in association with each other. This 
association was no coincidence, but reﬂected the aims of producers of 
representations, among them Chinese government ofﬁcials and people in the 
Chinese media. The 2000 auctions provided the ideal opportunity to explode 
the latent nationalism embedded in each of these discourses. 
  In 2008, “The Chinese Zodiac in Haiyan Tang of the Old Summer 
Palace Exhibition” was assembled in the Yuanmingyuan Park along the path 
leading to the Western Ruins section. The banner in front of the outside of the 
exhibit is captioned:
148 years of parting—the 12 animal heads of the Haiyantang reunite 
at Yuanmingyuan
1074 years of reﬁnement—the ﬁrst global exhibit of the 12 zodiacs with 
animal heads and human bodies
20 years of exploration—the fruit of Yuanmingyuan cultural property is 
exhibited. (My translation).
Arithmetic reveals that the three years referenced are 1860, 2004 and 1988, 
signifying respectively, when the zodiacs were ﬁrst looted from Yuanmingyuan, 
when three zodiac heads that had been repatriated (the third in 2003 by 
Stanley Ho) were put on national display in the Yuanmingyuan for a brief 
period, and when the Yuanmingyuan Ruins Park was formally opened to the 
public. However, whether these dates and their signiﬁcance are readily 
apparent to visitors reading the banner is questionable. The interior of the 
exhibit, advertised as free, features sketches of the original Haiyantang 
fountain, a couple pieces of statues from the site of the ruins locked in display 
cabinets and full-size replicas of each of the zodiac bronze heads mounted 
upon wooden bases with the location and status of each relic engraved in gold 
upon them. Smaller scale replicas of the  original full-body statues are also 
displayed. In addition, zodiac paraphernalia including stuffed animals, 
miniature bronze statues, books and keychains are sold at the small gift shop 
at the end of the exhibit and also in other gift shops throughout the 
Yuanmingyuan Park. (Based on multiple visits in the summer of 2009; the 
exhibit was closed for the winter when I returned in December of 2010). 
Representations of the zodiacs in park displays and commodiﬁed objects as 
well as popular media representations of the zodiacs in the news and in other 
television programs have contributed to a wide-spread and active collective 
memory of them within the broader collective memory of Yuanmingyuan.
  In the previous section, I proposed that the current collective memory of 
the Yuanmingyuan as a symbol of national humiliation is growing increasingly 
108infelicitous, that is, the etiquette embedded within collective memory that 
demands acknowledgement (not forgetting) of and sentimentality (nationalism) 
towards the Yuanmingyuan as a symbol of national humiliation continues to 
exist, but authentic emotions are no longer evoked by the sight of the physical 
ruins. I suggested that this infelicity was at least partly the result of a process 
of emotional displacement, by which obligatory emotions associated with the 
Yuanmingyuan ruins were given new outlets through association, making the 
original site less centrally relevant. In section 3, I hypothesized that while 
cultural memories may promote nationalist sentiment, expression of this 
sentiment only occurs when a new event recalls these memories in the context 
of their immediate relevance to the present. I now propose that the 
Yuanmingyuan zodiacs became catalysts for popular expressions of 
nationalism in the 21st century through a process of emotional displacement, 
in which the sentimentality associated with the Yuanmingyuan ruins in general 
was metonymically displaced onto the zodiacs, which had become 
immediately relevant through the auctions of 2000; this led to an explosion of 
authentic patriotic sentiment. On the other hand, the emotional displacement 
that served to incite this patriotic sentiment also served to diminish the 
emotional potency of the actual site of the Yuanmingyuan ruins, since 
emotional authority gradually stopped being associatively invested in the 
zodiacs through the ruins and became directly accessible through the zodiacs 
themselves. In summary, the collective memory of the Yuanmingyuan that was 
revived in the 1980s primarily through the emblem of the Yuanmingyuan ruins, 
has, in the 21st century, shifted its focus to the zodiac heads as its central 
symbol. This shift was necessary because the ruins as symbols were growing 
109trite and becoming increasingly overshadowed by other associations within the 
park.
  This idea can be used to expand upon what Haiyan Lee proposes when 
she calls the Yuanmingyuan a “super-sign” (in reference to a term used by 
Duara) and explains:
Such symbols acquire their potency and legitimacy precisely owing to 
the broad participation of cultural actors, not least the state, in 
converging signifying practices. But the more prominent a symbol 
becomes, the more liable it is to subversive appropriations, and thus it 
must be subjected to government surveillance. This explains why the 
state has been unsympathetic toward the anti-restorationist cause 
aimed at safeguarding the ofﬁcial memory. (184).
Conceptualizing the Yuanmingyuan as a collective memory has shown that if 
government surveillance is to continue to be successful in utilizing the 
symbolic potency of Yuanmingyuan, government ofﬁcials, rather than focusing 
their efforts on enforcing the status quo, must seek, as producers, to re-
appropriate the Yuanmingyuanʼs symbolism with new focuses through 
emotional displacement. However, whether “Disneyﬁcation” will provide that 
focus or serve to further diffuse the Yuanmingyuanʼs symbolism remains to be 
seen. It is likely that when new associations fail to re-focus emotional potency, 
and, as a result, the collective memory of Yuanmingyuan and its emotional 
impetus become too diffused, it will again become infelicitous and, as in the 
mid 20th century, eventually forgotten—at least until new producers with new 
ideological aims step forth to re-articulate the memory and re-assert its power 
through new representations for new collectives to accept, ignore or re-
appropriate.
110Conclusion
  In this paper, I have sought to invert traditional conceptions of the 
Yuanmingyuan as a historical site with strong nationalistic connotations, by 
framing Yuanmingyuan foremost as an evolving idea and illustrating how this 
idea has been re-introduced into popular discourse through association with 
physical sites and material objects. In articulating this theory I have 
conceptualized collective memory according to a triangular model in which 
interactions between producers, representations and consumers create a 
collective notion about a given subject that changes over time. I have used this 
theory and historical analysis of how the Yuanmingyuan was presented at 
different periods in the 20th century to further develop ideas about both how 
collective memory functions and how the collective memory of Yuanmingyuan 
was produced and received. One of the objects of this paper has been to 
address the question of why the idea of Yuanmingyuan has been so potent in 
forging cultural memory in the 1980s. I have shown that the Yuanmingyuanʼs 
historical link with national humiliation gave it an emotional charge that could 
be reignited in new contexts and that the physical site of the Yuanmingyuan 
garden and material remnants associated with it provided tangible symbols 
that were easily represented to large audiences. Thus Yuanmingyuanʼs 
multivocality and re-interpretability as a symbol, rather than subvert its 
ideological message, allowed it to be manipulated to ﬁt new contexts while 
exploiting old sentiments.
  My work is by no means a comprehensive answer, but, rather, is meant 
to suggest that further research is needed if the phenomenon of collective 
memory and Yuanmingyuan in particular are to be deeply understood. Further 
111inquiry into the Yuanmingyuan would beneﬁt from a more sophisticated 
analysis of the wealth of media depicting the Yuanmingyuan and more 
extensive ethnographic data to gauge popular reception. Another useful 
method of approach would be to compare Yuanmingyuan to other historical 
sights of cultural memory, both foreign and domestic. For example, the 
Parthenon in Greece is a well-researched site around which a similar kind of 
fantasy of national continuity has been projected (Hamilakis). The “Elgin 
Marbles” and calls for their repatriation have incited nationalistic passion and 
received global attention in a way that already invites comparison to the 
Yuanmingyuan zodiacs without the Elgin family connection, which links the 
father and son to the burglary of the Parthenon and Yuanmingyuan 
respectively. Two other Chinese sites the Yuanmingyuan might be fruitfully 
compared with are the Forbidden Palace (Gugong ނ܅) and Chengde ঝ℄, 
both former imperial palaces that are now modern tourists destinations and 
have been represented with speciﬁc ideological motives quite different from 
Yuanmingyuan. (See Hamlish and Hevia, “Restoration”). It is my hope that 
further studies of collective memory that deconstruct deeply entrenched 
fantasies such as “the state” and “the people” will yield more reﬁned insights 
into how signiﬁcation functions at national and global levels and how collective 
beliefs are formed.
112APPENDIX
“Introduction to Yuanmingyuan History” taken from the ofﬁcial Yuanmingyuan 
Park website: http://www.yuanmingyuanpark.com/zy/ymysjs.htm. (1994).
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